THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

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Are the Japanese Stalling?

During the first week after Japan's surrender, American public opinion was profoundly disturbed by the actions of the Japanese. Most of their radio speakers, from the Emperor down, refused to admit that Japan had been beaten to her knees. Some of them called the defeat only temporary and used terms which suggested a hope that the war can be resumed at a later date. The instructions we sent to Tokyo were not carried out strictly, and there were various unexplained delays. The men in the field were extraordinarily slow in laying down their arms and the Japanese government was curiously reluctant to use such modern facilities as the telephone and the telegraph in ordering its men to cease fire.

On the other hand, after the first Japanese emissaries had been to Manila and had departed, correspondents in that city reported that American officials did not believe the Japanese were stalling with some ulterior purpose in mind, such as going on with the war. The horrors of the atomic bomb evidently made a deeper impression on Japan than we at first realized. Manila said the slowness of the Japanese, and some of their odd actions, can be explained by the fact that they were stunned by their defeat and that they simply did not know how to go about surrendering. We may reserve judgment as to the plausibility of this theory.

The Emperor's Authority

There are some other matters as to which a final verdict must also be reserved. It will be many months, presumably, before we know whether the disadvantages of keeping Hirohito and the whole Imperial hierachy, described by T. A. Bisson on page 242 of this issue, outweigh the benefits we obtained by bringing the war to an end and saving the lives of many thousands of American soldiers and those of our Allies. It seems fairly clear that we were wrong if we assumed that Hirohito had complete authority over the country and that his order to surrender would be instantly and implicity obeyed. Indeed, in the light of history it may seem to us astonishing that he was able to get the troops to give up in as many areas as he did, within eight or nine days after the Japanese proposal was accepted. Some of the radio speeches from Tokyo which Americans found so highly objectionable were probably an attempt to placate commanders in the field who were of two minds as to whether they would surrender or not. It is at least possible that the Japanese fighter planes which shot at American bombers on photographic missions over Japan were acting on the initiative of local commanders in the field, or even of individual pilots. Meanwhile, the important fact is that by August 20 most of the fighting in all theaters seemed to be coming to an end, and our great test—whether we can keep the peace we have won at such high cost—was at hand.

Chungking, Yenan and Moscow

The conflict in China, described by Mr. Roth on page 248 of this issue, seems to be steadily deepening. Hostilities have already taken place, and more are threatened. Spokesmen for Communist China insist that they are entitled to participate in the formal surrender of the Japanese, and on a basis of area, population and

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above all, vigorous prosecution of the war, their point would appear to be well taken. Meanwhile, the Chungking government has announced that following the conversations between Soong and Stalin in Moscow, agreement has been reached on all points at issue between them. The terms of the agreement have not been published, so far as we know; Mr. Roth makes what seems to us a shrewd guess at their contents. Does this agreement mean that Soviet Russia has abandoned whatever interest she had in protecting the Chinese Communists of Yenan against aggression by Chungking? Some of the actions of Yenan spokesmen seem to indicate that they may think so. In any case, now that the Japanese war is over, the first order of business is an agreement which shall be satisfactory not only to the Chungking government and Russia but to Yenan as well. We see no reason why peace in China is not possible, on a basis far more liberal and democratic than Chungking, but also far short of a Communist revolution which the mass of the Chinese people presumably don't want. It is to be hoped that American policy will work toward such an agreement, and will not uphold Chungking against the Communists as another "bulwark against communism." Too many "bulwarks against communism" have proved completely ineffective in the past for us to have any enthusiasm about another.

Grew and MacArthur

Secretary Byrnes has shaken up the State Department to some extent, and more is promised in the future. Substituting Dean Acheson for Joseph Grew as Under-Secretary seems to us a wise decision, provided Mr. Grew is not being relieved in order to take a still more important place in relation to Far Eastern affairs, such as the post as political adviser to General MacArthur. When Robert Murphy was chosen political adviser to General Eisenhower, we predicted that trouble would ensue; and the unholy mess the Americans have made of military government in Germany has shown that we were right. Mr. Grew, in his thinking about Japan seems to us to parallel Mr. Murphy's views about Western Europe, and to be equally undesirable.

It was inevitable, no doubt, that General MacArthur would be chosen to direct the occupation of Japan. To pass him over would have been such an international sensation as to be virtually a scandal. He is excellently fitted to get tough, and stay tough, with any Japanese who seek to dispute his authority. We regret, however, that it was not possible to use for this purpose someone more in line with the liberal and democratic movements that are sweeping the world, and less inclined to appease, even unwittingly, the conservative social and economic elements in Japan which were behind this war, and would be glad to get behind another one.

British Debt Settlement

The *Economist* (London) is not an official organ, and usually does not speak either for the government of Britain or for her dominant financial interests. Nevertheless its editorial opinion is always interesting and frequently carries weight. Of particular concern to this country is the proposal which it has just made for a settlement of the blocked sterling, held to the account of other countries in payment of war imports, but not usable by them because of exchange restrictions. This constitutes Britain's "war debt" and totals in the neighborhood of £ four billion.

Britain cannot pay this debt by exports at least in any near future, because she needs exports to pay for currently required imports. In discussions of the subject, it has usually been assumed that the debt would be funded, with a carrying charge not too high for British foreign trade to bear. The *Economist* now proposes that it be settled at once by an ingenious method. Britain would ask her creditors to scale down the total because the debt was incurred at inflated war prices. As an inducement for this concession, Britain would offer to pay in cash as much as was knocked off the total. Thus if the debt were cut in half, the other half would be paid in full. If less than half were cut off, any remainder, after cash payment of an equal amount, would be funded.

Since none of this debt is owed to the United States, our interest in the matter is that payment of the debt would enlarge the purchasing power of the creditors —mainly India, Argentina, Egypt and Canada—who would then presumably buy more from us and Britain. This expansion of commerce in turn would help exchange stability and the Bretton Woods program for free multilateral trade. Therefore the *Economist* suggests—as has previously been suggested by Americans —that the money for cash payments of that part of the debt so to be liquidated be borrowed or obtained as a grant from this country.

It would be a good investment for us. But we doubt whether the *Economist's* program will find ready acceptance in Britain. Most of the English would rather stand on their own feet as soon as possible. They would rather have us make it possible for them to do so, not by giving them money, but by assuring full employment in this country and so increasing our imports. The *Economist's* pretty scheme would not long keep them out of trouble if we should have a depression.

Pétain

Just as de Gaulle was the symbol of French resistance, so Pétain was the symbol of French surrender and collaboration with the conqueror. De Gaulle, in spite of his faults, had to be made the head of the French State because of what he symbolized. So Pétain had to be convicted and sentenced to death, no matter

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what might be urged in extenuation of his behavior. Nothing less was required by the pride and the will to live of the French people.

We do not mean to imply that Pétain was not guilty of "intelligence with the enemy," as the jury decided —or indeed of other outrages and tyrannies as well. He could not bow to the will of a cruel master without being cruel to his compatriots. But the jury, in view of his age, and also probably to allow for any humanitarian motives he may have had, recommended commutation of the sentence. De Gaulle happily substituted life imprisonment for death. The judgment of the court was in itself enough to vindicate the honor of France. There is no need to make a martyr of a man because he had a mean intelligence and lacked imagination. His significance for the future can safely be left to the judgment passed upon him.

Unemployment Benefits

A correspondent points out that since President Truman asked Congress to increase unemployment benefits a number of states have improved their standards in this respect. An editorial in our issue of July 23 supporting Mr. Truman's request stated that most of the states pay benefits which are at the highest not more than $15 or $18 a week and do so for a maximum period of 16 weeks. Out of 51 "states" (including Alaska, the District of Columbia and Hawaii), 32 have raised their standards during the present year. Twenty-seven, which include more than 77 percent of all covered workers, now pay a maximum benefit of $20 or more. In 32, the duration of the benefit has been increased to 20 or more weeks. These cover 79 percent of the workers in question. In spite of this improvement, we regret that Mr. Truman's recommendation to raise the maximum to $25 by federal action was not adopted by Congress before the recess. In addition to giving more adequate safeguards than most of the states have provided, it would have covered federal employees, seamen and others not subject to state laws. This change should be high on the agenda of Congress when it reconvenes.

Ten Million New Homes

Senators Robert F. Wagner (D., N. Y.) and Allen J. Ellender (D., La.) have joined in presenting a postwar housing bill to the Senate, calling for the building of 10 million new homes in the next 10 years. They expect to have bi-partisan support for the measure when it is taken up after the summer recess. The Wagner housing plan follows the "survey and budget" scheme included in the Full Employment Bill. The government would make regular surveys of housing needs, private constructors would be urged to fill the demand, and the government would undertake to provide public housing to fill whatever part of the demand the private builders did not meet, particularly in the low-rental field which the private constructors have never been able to supply. "This is not a large program for our whole country," Senator Ellender said, "but it is a good beginning. It will at least offer a way to learn by doing."

Senator Robert Taft, who heads a committee which has been studying postwar housing, is not a sponsor of the Wagner bill. He and other bitter-end opponents of an adequate housing program for America will undoubtedly be primed to sabotage or kill this program when it comes up in the fall. But Senator Wagner's program will be needed, both for its own sake and as a main support of the total full-employment program.

Minimum Wages

The introduction of a bill sponsored by ten leading Democratic Senators to raise the minimum wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act from 40 to 65 cents an hour immediately, and eventually to 75 cents an hour, is a hopeful sign that something is finally going to be done to eliminate substandard wages in American industry. The present 40-cent minimum provided by that Act was never an adequate wage and with the sharp wartime rise in living costs, it has long been completely unrealistic. A substantial lifting of the federal minimum wage has been recommended by, among others, the Pepper Committee, by William H. Davis as Director of Economic Stabilization and by Judge Vinson as Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion. Since the workers who would benefit most from the bill are the least organized elements in American industry, including a substantial segment of white-collar workers, it is essential that Congress act promptly to reduce the burden of wartime living costs. Consideration of the proposed measure, which also provides for a necessary broadening of the coverage of the Fair

Fitzpatrick in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch

The New Era

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Labor Standards Act, should receive high priority when Congress reconvenes. It is unfortunate that the measure was not jointly sponsored by Republicans and Democrats, since the elimination of substandard wages need not and should not be a party controversy.

A Spanish Republican President

The Spanish Republicans have now taken a long step toward bringing a new government into being. An extraordinary session of the Cortes was held a few days ago in Mexico City and, as the *New Republic* predicted last week, Diego Martinez Barrio was elected provisional president. That the Spanish exiles were able to agree to this extent was largely a tribute to the powers of conciliation possessed by Dr. Juan Negrín, former premier and one of the outstanding personalities among Spanish anti-fascists. He will certainly have an important role in the new government though possibly not that of premier, in view of the opposition to him in some quarters. Now that a strictly legitimate Spanish Republican government exists, there is less excuse than ever for America and Britain to continue to keep Franco in an authority which he would lose overnight without them.

British Labor's Program

With the opening of Parliament, the first steps in the program of the British Labor Party have become apparent. Though the speech with which the session begins is put into the mouth of the King, this is, of course, no more than a rhetorical device. The King expresses the wishes of the party in power, no matter what it may be; his personal predilections have nothing to do with the matter.

There were several significant omissions in the King's speech. One of them was Palestine, and the ambition of the Jews to establish a real homeland there. President Truman has stepped into the breach by expressing the hope that Palestine shall be opened to as many Jews as possible. This is certainly a reasonable and moderate request, in line with American wishes as expressed on more than one occasion by our Congress. The past history of the British Labor Party on the Palestinian question suggests that the omission of the subject from the King's speech may have had some special reason, and should not be taken as indicating a lack of sympathy with Jewish aspirations.

A second important omission was the question of Spain. We hope that the Labor Party will live up to Harold Laski's vigorous repudiation of Franco, in spite of Mr. Atlee's waving Laski aside as a spokesman for Labor Party foreign policy. When Franco is so near to collapse it would be tragic if the Labor Party, perhaps in coöperation with conservatives in the American State Department, should bolster him up now.

Two other subjects omitted from the King's speech were Hong Kong and Greece. Millions of Englishmen believe that Hong Kong should at once be turned over to the Chinese, and a large proportion of them undoubtedly voted for Labor candidates. The same millions bitterly objected to the Churchill policy in Greece, and are waiting for an explicit sign that the new cabinet will abandon efforts to thwart the will of the democratic elements in that country.

If the King's speech was silent on Palestine, Spain, Hong Kong and Greece, it was vocal on another difficult question of British policy—India. The speech said that "the government will do their utmost to promote, in conjunction with the leaders of Indian opinion, the early realization of self-government in India." That would seem reasonably clear and definite.

Otherwise, the speech noted with gratitude the end of the war. It endorsed the Potsdam decisions, welcomed the Council of Foreign Ministers, and approved the Charter of the United Nations. Great Britain will work on the problems of displaced persons, demobilization and continuing shortages of all sorts of consumer goods. Export trade will be stressed; natural resources will be used to maximum advantage for the benefit of everyone. The housing problem, which contributed so much to Labor's victory, will be tackled with energy. With it go town and country planning and schemes for using all the land to best advantage, whether under private or public ownership. Two pieces of legislation unpopular with Labor will be repealed —the acts controlling trade unions and regulating trade disputes. Social security will be extended, and transportation and education reorganized.

Perhaps the most important immediate provisions of the speech are the announcements that the Bank of England and the coal mines are to be nationalized. Many Americans seem to have an idea that nationalizing the Bank means that all experienced bank officials will be dismissed and their places taken by government employees with little or no training. In fact, of course, the only changes made will be at the top, and will be quite invisible to the ordinary borrower or depositor. What Americans should remember is that the Bank of England is in fact a central bank, which controls credit and currency policies in general rather than making loans to individual companies or business men. Even in the United States the Federal Reserve System, which always was conceived as a measure of control in the public interest, has increasingly come under government direction and served to exercise government policy. In Great Britain, as elsewhere, the central bank must carry out the policies of the government in power, so long as it has an active economic program. It would be intolerable that the Labor Cabinet should be thwarted in its aims by banker opposition. Labor Party members remember vividly the days when Britain returned to gold too soon, and valued

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the pound too high, for the benefit of the investing and trading class, to the accompaniment of unemployment and suffering among the poor. It does not propose to permit such conditions to be repeated.

As for the British coal mines, it has been notorious for many years that they have reached a point where government intervention is imperative. Mining methods are for the most part inefficient by American standards; a majority of the best seams have been exhausted, leaving only the poorer ones still to be worked. The industry has been kept going only on a basis of shockingly low wages and wretched conditions for the greater part of the miners. Some time ago the government found it necessary to take over control of the royalties, based on mine ownership, as distinguished from operation. What is now proposed—nationalization of the mines themselves—is only a logical next step. In no other way can the miners be given decent wages and working conditions, and Great Britain still be able to maintain her competitive position in the coal markets of the world.

American conservatives are accepting the results of the British election with a very bad grace. Many of them are saying openly that the United States should not lend money to the British while they keep a socialist government in power. We are not at all sure that the British want to borrow money in this country, but whether they do or don't, the attitude of these conservative Americans seems to us unwise in the highest degree. It is to the common interest of the United States and Great Britain that full employment and maximum prosperity should be maintained in both countries. The Labor government is launching a hopeful and exciting experiment to bring this about in Britain—an experiment which, in our judgment, has a good chance of succeeding, and should be duplicated in large degree in the United States. It is by no means certain that we have the power to sabotage this experiment, even if we want to; but we should not want to. If the United States and Great Britain should split, the hope of permanent peace will be jeopardized.

Transition to Peace

THE TRUMAN administration has now told the nation that it expects widespread unemployment by next spring, but that it believes this need be only temporary, that we can have full employment and maximum production in 12 to 18 months, and that the Truman administration is prepared to lead us to it if we are prepared to follow. Reconversion Director Snyder's recent report and President Truman's executive order which followed contain these great new promises. But the partial plans outlined in the two documents would indicate that there is still much work to be done if the promises are to become reality.

The Snyder report states the facts of our present economic situation and lays down what presumably are the keystones of the Truman policy to carry us smoothly from war to peace. War-contract cancellations are expected to reach $35 billion in a few weeks. At least seven million men will be demobilized within the next year. There will be five million or more unemployed in three months, the Snyder report estimates, rising to perhaps eight million by spring. The administration sees its job ahead as one of redirecting our four main resources, "our manpower, our raw materials, our plant and equipment, and our managerial know-how," from war to peace. As soon as the administration thinks it can remove various price, wage, and production controls, without wrecking the economy, it will do so. "Collective bargaining and a free market" will be controls enough for our economy in the future, the President indicates. "The urgent need to increase peacetime production is the keystone of all the government's economic policy and planning," and the administration is confident that we can achieve this goal under a "peacetime economy of free independent private enterprise."

The basic fault with the Snyder report is its failure to recognize government responsibility for helping to provide jobs and security. It timidly says merely that labor, management, agriculture and the general public must play the vital parts in the task, that the part of government is "to assist and encourage this great cooperative effort toward prosperity." Under prodding from the press, President Truman has since reversed this position and has declared the Full Employment Bill "must legislation." The Snyder recommendations on legislation are far too mild to carry the necessary weight with Congress apathetic about its responsibility. They include: increased unemployment compensation, increased minimum-wage standards, public-works appropriations, and preservation of the U. S. Employment Service system. President Truman should certainly send Congress a much more explicit and extensive request for legislation when it reconvenes. He should request more funds for housing and public works than are now called for in any of the pending legislation. Extension of the social-security system through the Wagner-Murray-Dingell amendments, increased benefits to veterans through supplements to the GI Bill of Rights, a permanent Fair Employment Practice Committee, a 65-cent-an-hour minimum wage through the Pepper amendment, are all necessary parts of the job program, omitted from the Snyder report, which Mr. Truman should fight to have Congress pass.

The President's executive order on reconversion is more reassuring than the Snyder report it is supposed to implement. It seems to say clearly what the Snyder report was trying to whisper as to how the government agencies are to conduct themselves during the transition. The executive order says, in effect, that we are working toward the time when all wartime controls

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can be removed, but that time is not yet. There is a new urgency in his directives to Economic Stabilizer Davis, Price Administrator Bowles and Secretary of Agriculture Anderson to prevent inflation or deflation, telling them not only to keep on all present controls that are necessary but to "improve and tighten" controls where they are not now adequate. The change over to peace is the government's responsibility, the reconversion order says, as "the final stage of the war emergency," and government controls over prices, wages and production are in order until there is no prospect of domestic crisis.

The President's order recognizes the basic points that: "the general stability of prices and costs and the maintenance of purchasing power . . . are indispensable to the shift of business enterprises from wartime to peacetime production and of individuals from wartime to peacetime employment." Under its terms, the War Labor Board is permitted to allow wage increases to correct inequities, disregarding the Little Steel formula or any other regulation that stands in the way. But it is at the same time ordered to maintain its wartime control over labor disputes that would interfere with reconversion, a policy distasteful to a large part of organized labor.

The War Production Board is authorized to use all its powers to expand production of materials in short supply, to control inventories so as to stop hoarding, to allocate materials and assign priorities to assure production of low-cost items, give the little man a fair chance for materials, and break reconversion bottlenecks. But even while the reconversion order was being released, WPB was tossing aside controls that would be necessary to carry out those instructions. Less than one week after V-J Day, WPB had revoked virtually every order enforcing the Controlled Materials Plan, had discarded regulation M-388 for production of low-cost clothing, and was planning for a wide open market in such basic supplies as steel, aluminum, and copper. Mr. Truman will have to install a strong OWMR police system if he is to be sure that his reconversion orders are carried out.

Ira Mosher, president of the National Association of Manufacturers, says that not more than 1,500,000 workers will be unemployed more than 30 days. Bernard Baruch, on his seventy-fifth birthday, predicted that we shall see four or five years of prosperity even though "not much brains" are used. Senator Taft and the NAM, among others, are preparing to gut the Full Employment Bill with amendments. Our President seems aware of the real issues involved in this fight for security at home. To lead us in it, he must have the courage to tackle powerful enemies and the skill to organize his forces for victory.

What is lacking in the program so far is any sense of the problem as a whole. It is simply assumed, without estimates, that private enterprise will create abundance and mop up the unemployed. Reconversion is conceived as an orderly retreat by government in order to leave the field to business. How different is this from the program in Britain and other nations! There, the state steps in with constructive programs of its own to make sure first that the productive capacity of the nation shall be directed to supply the most urgent needs of the people. Private enterprise is allowed to coöperate with this program, and to do what it can in addition. There is no doubt whatever that full employment will be the outcome. Here, much doubt remains.

Atomic and Human Energy

THE FIRST USE of the atomic bomb against a hostile population has, in spite of its stunning success as a weapon of war, brought forth expressions of guilt and horror from many parts of the world. These emotions have been felt even in the victorious nations, and even by persons who are glad on the whole that it was employed to bring the war to a quick end. They are probably less strong in the United States than in England, which has suffered the actual experience of indiscriminate devastation from the air. It is indeed difficult to justify use of an extreme form of the kind of weapon which hitherto has proved to us the cruelty of our enemies. This feeling of guilt gives poignancy to the fear that at some time in the future a more highly developed embodiment of the same awful agency may be used against ourselves, or perhaps to destroy the entire human race.

In terms of logic it is easy to answer the contention that any new weapon is so much worse than others that it ought not to be sanctioned. The individual victim is no better off if he is maimed or killed by a shell, a bullet, a bayonet, or even by a sword, an arrow, or a caveman's club, than if he is disintegrated or seared by an explosion of "the Manhattan engineering project." The quantitative killing power of its single blow is indeed far greater than anything hitherto known, and yet it took tens of thousands of men many months to prepare to deliver that blow. If they had been soldiers in the armies of Caesar or Attila they might have killed as many people in the same length of time.

It is objected that such a weapon cannot be loosed without murdering thousands of non-combatants, including women and children. The same objection, however, applied with equal force to the strategic bombing of enemy cities. Ever since the days of chivalry, military men have tried to bulwark the honor of their profession by codes which impose limitations on the cruelties of war. But these limitations have never survived for long or prevented the infliction of misery and death upon hordes of innocent persons who could not fight back. When the technology of war began to demand

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the mobilization of whole populations and the employment of all their productive equipment, the traditions of chivalry could no longer have much practical application.

To admit all this is not to grant that the hesitations and fears about the atomic bomb are groundless. They are, however, futile as long as they are confined to an attempt to exclude some methods of warfare as opposed to others. As many have recognized, the eradication of Hiroshima is a dramatic proof, not that we must or can fail to use the utmost destructive power available to us when we wage war, but rather that mankind can no longer afford to wage war.

Efforts to keep the secret of the atomic bomb or to confine its use to purposes which are assumed to be legitimate may succeed for a short time, but are sure to break down in the end. Scientific discoveries are nobody's secret as long as human minds can function anywhere. In the past they have frequently been made almost simultaneously by different investigators who had no aid from one another. They depend, not so much on the genius of individuals as on the advance of the total body of knowledge, which cannot be concealed. As long as a single and relatively rare raw material is needed, a few nations, or the world organization, may control access to that material, but there is no assurance that ways may not be found to derive explosive energy from other and more abundant elements. The sheer expense of the converting and manufacturing processes may temporarily debar smaller nations from making use of them, but the chief danger of war does not arise from small nations in any event. The only sure safeguard against disaster lies not in control of the weapon, but in civilizing the human beings who may wish to use the weapon.

President Truman has expressed the common hope that constructive uses of atomic energy may be developed which will counterbalance its destructive potentialities. The advance of the human race in ability to produce goods and raise the material level of life has been in large measure a result of gains in the harnessing of mechanical power. If at length we can master such a tremendous and ultimate source of power it may be possible to abolish material want for all men and for all time.

This hope, however, is as vulnerable to misdirection as the fear with which it is associated. The mere discovery of a new source of power cannot in itself greatly change the economic organization of a world in which mechanical power is a commonplace. The cost of steam or electric energy has already been so reduced that it is a minor percentage in familiar industrial processes. A new source of power might favor the development of industry in regions which do not have easy access to coal, petroleum or water power, but it would not automatically create abundance.

Immense changes are of course set in motion by new technological processes. Nevertheless the experience of the world during the past century indicates that the practical and widespread use of a new mechanical principle is frequently delayed for many years after its discovery, and that when this use does occur, it usually creates as many problems as it solves. During the decade before the war, the more advanced industrial countries already had the technical knowledge to produce enough to abolish poverty. They did not, however, have the ability to distribute what they could produce. What we need in order to benefit from the release of atomic energy is almost exactly what we needed to benefit from internal-combustion engines and all other improvements in our production. This need was very imperfectly fulfilled by existing human institutions. The peaceful potentialities of atomic energy are therefore like its military potentialities, in that they have intensified a challenge to increase our understanding of human society and to improve its organization.

We must understand that both our fears and our hopes are centered not about the material forces of the universe, but about ourselves. The explosive energies of the human personality are far greater than those of the atom, and can have a more devastating effect if released in the wrong way. The material which is studied by the physicists is neutral and impersonal. What is done with it depends upon the nature of the persons under whose control it happens to fall. The science of human personality and of the society composed of human individuals has lagged far behind the science of the physical universe. Religions, philosophies, ethical systems have all striven to make their contribution, but this contribution has been inadequate to the responsibilities which our one-sided knowledge has imposed upon us. It is high time for us to concentrate our attention and our ingenuity on achieving as penetrating, as accurate, as cool and as competent a body of knowledge about how to choose our aims and how to effectuate them as we have hitherto devoted to discovering the secrets of matter.

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Japan's Strategy of Revival

WORKING SKILLFULLY amid the ruins of a crushing military defeat, Japan's rulers have already laid the basis for their continued existence today and the revival of tomorrow. The broad outlines of the oligarchy's strategy for the winning of the peace were painfully visible during the tantalizing three-day vigil ending on the night of August 14. Japan's palace guard was conducting a successful campaign on three fronts: first, preservation of the inviolability of the Emperor; second, maintenance of the Imperial throne; third, interposition of the Imperial government between the Supreme Allied Commander and the Japanese people for the effectuation of all measures, military and political, decreed by the victorious powers. The last point, the most subtle example of the political skill of the Japanese oligarchy in recent history, carried the gravest dangers if permitted to continue beyond the period when the use of the Emperor's authority might be needed to accomplish the military surrender.

It comes as a shock, in the blitzkrieg pace of events, to realize that here one is not considering some hypothetical strategy for the future. In all essentials it is already an accomplished fact, which can be reversed or turned to advantage only at the cost of a herculean effort. Many people in the United Nations believed that Emperor Hirohito was a war criminal, and that he should be tried as such before an international tribunal. Is it now to be expected that Emperor Hirohito will ever come to trial? A puppet, after all, has to be protected, and unless the Emperor's puppet role is speedily terminated following completion of military surrender, his inviolability will be effectively guaranteed. As our puppet, moreover, the Emperor will also be protected from the dangers of internal convulsion. A swift overturn through popular revolt, on every count the safest form of political insurance with respect to postwar Japan, must now be ruled out as an unlikely probability. These are startling victories for the Japanese oligarchy to have won in the first days of its defeat. By the same token, they represent costly political setbacks for the people of the United Nations.

In no respect is clearer thinking required at the present time than on the vital issue of the Emperor's puppet role. The advantages to be derived from it, in this writer's opinion, attach exclusively to the military sphere. Thereafter, Hirohito should be stripped of authority and forced to stand trial. Continuance of the Emperor as our puppet, especially for the purpose of effecting political reforms in Japan, will play directly into the hands of the oligarchy. In the effort to turn the Emperor into a tool for accomplishing political changes within Japan, we shall be handling a two-edged sword. It is a weapon congenial to Japanese experience and background, but for us an untried instrument. Japan's oligarchy will be wielding it with a determination born of desperation, and with the single-minded aim of preserving their power. Are our aims equally single-minded? If our high officials are not intent on destroying the Imperial regime and replacing it with a new constitutional structure based on the will of the Japanese people, can we feel any real assurance that the oligarchs will not come off victor in a contest for the use of the Emperor's authority? A truly democratic instrument, one that we should be using, is a broad popular movement, embracing all progressive-minded Japanese and aiming at the establishment of a genuinely democratic government structure.

Considered from this angle, it may be advisable to reëxamine some of the political benefits of Imperial puppetry that so many radio and news commentators have toted up so glibly. To a Western mind, it is crystal clear that Hirohito's subjects will lose respect for the godhead of an Emperor reduced to the puppet of a foreign military commander. Before taking this judgment for a fact, I should have to feel far more certain of Japanese mass psychology and its reactions. It may be so, but then it may not, and particularly if the machinery of Japan's government continues to be vested in the Emperor and the oligarchy. Will the oligarchy or its subjects have the freer access to the radio, press, and public platform? The fact that the Emperor has been able, in the words of his rescript, "to safeguard and maintain the structure of the Imperial State," tends to elicit the customary reactions, to keep things running in the old grooves, to lead the people to look for and accept guidance from their old rulers instead of striking out a new path for themselves. We should not expect the Emperor's blinders to drop from the Japanese people's eyes overnight, as by some magical formula. The blinders will drop off only as the result of a desperate popular struggle to overthrow the Imperial system. We shall be either naïve or hypocritical if we pretend that our keeping the Emperor in power as our puppet is giving help to the Japanese people's struggle.

Again, these commentators seemed very generally agreed that responsibility for Japan's unparalleled military defeat will attach to the Emperor. Is he not conducting the negotiations for the surrender and will he not have to take orders from a foreign commander? On this point, too, there may be room for academic doubt. Japanese political tradition and practice do not pin

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responsibility for mistakes on the Emperor, but on his advisers. General Korechika Anami, the War Minister, is but the first of a long list of suicides that will atone for the distress occasioned the Emperor by the shortcomings of his subjects. It is significant that the military leaders are most prominent in these acts of self-immolation. Today it is their cue to assume responsibility for the disaster. In this they are but demonstrating the infallibility of the judgment of our ex-Under-Secretary of State, who maintained all along that not the Emperor but his evil "militarist" advisers were responsible for the war.

Grew's platform, of course, has fitted in perfectly with the requirements of Japan's peace strategy. The Emperor now continues to rule, as he should, and the oligarchy's other "good" representatives, the palace guard, the bureaucrats and the *Zaibatsu,* continue to run the government for him. What it is so hard to see, apparently, is that these "good" members of the oligarchy are the natural allies and associates of the "evil" militarists. It will be time enough to bring the military back into the fold later, when the Allied occupation has become a thing of the past. Even here the oligarchy introduces a clever quirk into the game by entrusting the new Cabinet to Prince Higashi-Kuni, "good" as a member of the Imperial family but "evil" as a professional army man. In permitting the Prince to form a Cabinet we are, regretfully, sanctioning the continued political influence of the military in the Japanese government. Only the most obstinate political bias will prevent a person from seeing the moral. If we are against the Japanese "militarists," but not against the Emperor and the rest of the oligarchy, we shall be outmaneuvered at every point in the game. Must we lose the game before we learn that the quintessence of a correct political policy toward Japan is to help the people throw out the oligarchy?

The game is not yet lost, but the steps taken thus far are sufficient to shake the confidence of all but the most optimistic and unwary. When MacArthur is finally established in Tokyo, he will have all needed powers to retrieve the positions already lost. Will he use these powers on his own initiative to seek the reversal of the *faits accomplis* of August 11-14? If not, the only recourse will be the greatest outburst of public protest in American political history.

MacArthur will be forewarned, and not only by the difficulties encountered in accomplishing Japan's final military surrender. He will have noted Emperor Hirohito's rescript, the most stunning pronouncement ever to issue from a defeated ruler supposedly acting as the instrument of a victorious coalition. This document brazenly justifies Japan's war of conquest: "Indeed, we declared war on America and Britain out of our sincere desire to insure Japan's self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement." Its farewell to the "allies" of yesterday repeats the Pan-Asiatic "liberation" slogan under which Japan has fought: "We cannot but express the deepest sense of regret to our allied nations of East Asia, who have consistently coöperated with the Empire toward the emancipation of East Asia." Its references to the atomic bomb, filled out by the accompanying statements of other Japanese leaders, lay the groundwork for the propaganda campaign of the future which will attribute the defeat not to any failure of the Yamato spirit but to the superior technology and science of the enemy.

As indicated by significant textual variations, the different English translations of the rescript are quite evidently incomplete. The New York *Post,* for example, quotes the Emperor as saying that "in the contents of the reply (by the Allies), the sovereignty of the Emperor is recognized. May you understand this . . ." In this most revealing passage (omitted in the texts supplied by the New York *Times* and the New York *Herald-Tribune*), the Emperor was enabled to borrow support from us to strengthen his position in the eyes of his people. It should come as no surprise that a policy which throughout the war studiously refrained from attacking the Emperor should end by enabling him to report to his people in the crisis of defeat that the United Nations recognized his sovereignty.

The documentary texts on this issue, moreover, are by no means so clear-cut as the people of the United Nations have been led to believe. Japan's surrender offer was made on August 10. Our reply of August 11 carried this statement: "The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people." In fact, however, the Potsdam Declaration does not explicitly refer in any clause to the ultimate *form of government* of Japan. The nearest approach to such a statement appears in clause 12, which declares that Allied occupation forces will not be withdrawn from Japan until "there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government." Is it to be assumed that the establishment of a "peacefully inclined and responsible government" is synonymous with a choice as to the "ultimate form of government?"

The Japanese authorities dealt with this question in the manner best fitted to serve their interests. Their reply of August 14 carefully ignored the statement regarding Japan's ultimate form of government in our note of August 11, but accepted the Potsdam terms. The Emperor's rescript clearly barred any assumption that the "ultimate form of government of Japan" is subject to change. The people of the United Nations

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have been led to believe that it is subject to change. Who is right? Here, clearly, is an ambiguity—I shall not use a stronger word—that requires immediate clarification by the State Department, which acted for the United Nations in this matter. Needless to say, the issue is basic, since it concerns the all-important subject of whether the political changes within Japan will be far-reaching enough to bar from power those who would plot a war of revenge.

Assuming for the moment that United Nations' policy does mean to give the Japanese people an opportunity to change their form of government, about which doubt will continue to exist until the State Department explicitly challenges Emperor Hirohito's interpretation of the point, the next question is how and under what conditions the opportunity will be forthcoming. If an election is not to be a farce, the largest measure of freedom must be permitted for the emergence of democratic parties genuinely opposed to the Japanese oligarchy. Should an independent Allied military government be set up in Japan, such parties would undoubtedly emerge. If, however, the reins of government continue in the hands of the Emperor and the oligarchy, even though they be acting under the orders of General MacArthur, the situation is entirely different. Can it be thought that the Emperor and the oligarchy will faithfully carry out orders from MacArthur which will raise up parties dedicated to their overthrow? And that a Cabinet acting under the Emperor and composed of representatives of the oligarchy will institute and carry through an election, one result of which might be a change in the "form of government" of Japan? However the matter be approached, it comes to a *reductio ad absurdum*. The conclusion may be summed up in this way: Emperor Hirohito and the oligarchy can act as MacArthur's puppet in effecting a military surrender which keeps them in power. But Emperor Hirohito and the oligarchy cannot be made to act politically so as to destroy themselves.

What, then, are our political intentions toward Japan? The answer would seem to be clear, though not entirely palatable. There will be no real effort to develop a popularly based movement radical enough and strong enough to sweep out the old regime. (It will be interesting to note how soon Susumu Okano, Communist leader of the Japanese People's Emancipation League at Yenan, is permitted to reënter Japan.) On the contrary, the Allied forces of occupation will almost certainly be engaged in protecting the "law and order" represented by the cabinet of Emperor Hirohito. The Imperial system will be maintained, even as the Emperor has declared to his people. So also will the Constitution of 1889, on which the Imperial system is grounded. No Weimar Constitution, in other words, may be drafted by the Japanese people. Under some prodding, Emperor Hirohito may be induced to propose a few minor and unimportant amendments to the Constitution. The crucial issue of political change in Japan will be fobbed off with these face-saving constitutional amendments, which will not even budge the oligarchy from their seats of power.

A final re-reading of the Potsdam Declaration, in the light of the events of the past two weeks, provides frightening confirmation of these conclusions. Its best passages are marred by failure to recognize that the Imperial clique and the *Zaibatsu* are responsible, equally with the militarists, for Japan's wars of conquest. "The time has come," states clause four "for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by these self-willed militaristic advisers . . ." Turn it as you will, there is nothing more here than the "evil" army advisers of the Emperor. The ringing sentence of clause six falls under the same suspicion: "There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world." The jarring note is provided by "irresponsible militarism." Did Japan go to war because "irresponsible" generals refused to heed their "moderate" Emperor? The cure for Japan's aggression will not emerge from so shallow an analysis of its ruling forces and the way in which they operate. And, in clause 10, this: "The Japanese government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people." The "Japanese government" shall remove . . . but why not the United Nations forces of occupation? Ah, yes! Hirohito will do it under our orders. The Imperial oligarchy knew what it was about when it accepted the Potsdam terms.

T. A. BISSON

Heat Wave, Remembered

Breathe in this bronze; take this outrageous sun
Full on the eyeballs; never hope to look
Where willows spread, or lovely ripples run:
Even the water in the steamer's wake
Thickens like mottled copper, with a shine
Too glaring, even by avarice unowned,
All red and yellow like the flag of Spain.

Along old lanes, the sheep are white and clean,
The color of cloud, the cedars dark and tall:
He leadeth me, said one, by pastures green,
He leadeth me beside the waters still,
And underneath His everlasting shadow
The fiery pit will blossom as the meadow.

ROLFE HUMPHRIES

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Getting Along with Russia

As THE GREATEST of wars fades out in a rumble of tanks across the Manchurian plains, man's thoughts revolve around the question of whether it will ever happen again. Among the articulate and the molders of opinion, two main points of view seem to hold the center of the stage. One is that, with the development of atom bombs and rockets to carry them unpiloted to the ends of the earth, another war is simply unthinkable, and therefore it will not occur. The other is that with the emergence of two great powers preëminent over all others in the world, representing social systems diametrically opposed, war between them—between the USA and the USSR—is inevitable.

The lessons of all past history seem to argue against both these black-and-white conclusions—one as blindly optimistic as that to which most of us succumbed after the last war, the other cynical and pessimistic in the extreme. Each new advance in the harnessing of nature has been turned to whatever purpose is man's main business at the moment: be it peace or war. The most powerful aggressor in this war, Germany, was led by men who were completely indifferent to human life. Witness the ten million willfully murdered in gas chambers or by planned starvation within or beyond the walls of concentration camps. There is no question but that any future would-be-aggressor state would equally set world domination as its goal. It would therefore also put all moral scruples behind it. So another war is not unthinkable.

But neither is it inevitable. Those who assume that the Soviet Union and America must fight either because of the power drives that are supposed to be inherent in all great states, or because of their opposing social systems, ignore history. (They also ignore so potent a factor as the will of the peoples, but that we will leave aside for a moment.) During the entire 170 years of existence of this republic, we and Russia have *always* had opposing social systems. Until the Bolsheviks came to power there in 1917, ours was, beyond all argument, the most radical state in the world, in its virtually complete break with feudalism. Among the great powers, the Russian Empire was the most autocratic, feudal and backward. Americans made no secret of their abhorrence of Russia's exile system and its medieval pogroms against the Jews. The Tsars were equally repelled by the audacity of our democracy.

Yet Tsarist Russia and the budding American Republic never waged war. More, *Russia, Tsarist or Soviet, is the only great power with which the United States, or the colonies out of which they grew, has never been at war.* In colonial days, we warred with France over the vital issue of the expansion of the frontier. Britain we fought for our freedom, and again, in 1812, to maintain it. In the last half century we have warred with Spain, Italy, Japan, Turkey and twice with Germany, Austria-Hungary and its successor states. If one adds the conflict a century ago with Mexico, and again in 1914; the hostilities in two wars with Bulgaria; the suppression of the Boxer rebellion in China and the maintenance of some forces there ever since, the picture becomes even more impressive. We have been in armed conflict with governments or peoples in every corner of the globe, *except Russia.* More to the point, *our national interests*, real or fancied, have required the sanction of arms *vis-à-vis* all these states, but *never* against Russia.

But, one hears voices in interruption, what about our intervention in Russia in 1918? Closely examined, that incident is literally the exception which proves the rule. Our forces landed in two places, Archangel and Vladivostok. In the latter case, even according to recent Russian sources and the personal acknowledgment of Litvinov, our action was directed mainly toward curbing the Japanese, who were then our allies, and who put ashore seven times as many men as we. In the long run, thanks largely to our democratically minded commander on the spot, General William S. Graves, we succeeded in our objective, with a minimum of interference in the affairs of the Russians.

The small force we landed at Archangel represented in fact that "ideological war" of which one hears so much today. Yet even here our national interests, which were not in conflict with those of Russia, overrode the political desire to prevent an experiment in revolutionary socialism from taking place in that country. We were the most powerful and the freshest of the Allied forces in the First World War, having suffered negligible casualties. Yet we sent the smallest force of intervention and played the least important role in organizing, financing and equipping the anti-Soviet armies. Every one of our Allies *and enemies* in Europe, and Japan and Turkey in Asia, took a more active part in that war of intervention than we.

There are those who contend that our relative passivity in the war of intervention was due to our distance from the scene. Although that is only partly true, it demonstrates again that our *national interests* were not in conflict. This is borne out also by our policy toward Russia's territorial holdings. We were the last to recognize the independence of the Baltic states and we never recognized Rumania's seizure of Bessarabia. Our European allies in that war felt that their national interests, as well as their hatred of Bolshevism, dictated the weakening of Russia, as distinct from its government. We were moved by no such considera-

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tions and had always benefited by the existence of a strong Russia to counterbalance our early enemy in Europe, England, and more recently Germany.

There was a final factor accounting for the weakness of our intervention in 1918 which is of the greatest importance for today. It is that Russia, which had never been our enemy, had fought for three bloody years on the side we finally joined. To the very degree that our consciences were troubled by having an autocracy as ally in a war "to save the world for democracy," we rejoiced at the overthrow of the Tsar. Despite governmental abhorrence of the later—Bolshevik—revolution, public opinion, particularly among labor, was strongly pro-Russian. It is a fact worth pondering that the first general strike in our history took place in the 100-percent American city of Seattle in 1919 for the *political* purpose of preventing the shipping of supplies to Vladivostok for use against the Soviet government!

This brings us to the present day. We alone among the powers have *no* tradition of war against Russia and therefore no mass chauvinism against them as a people. The reverse is equally true. Russia, which never fought us, has fought Germany and every state east of it during the past 700 years, France and England in the past century, Italy and Japan in the present.

We *have* a tradition of alliance with the Russians in the two greatest wars in history, and of close friendship and amicable solution of problems prior to that. Catherine the Great was desirous of maintaining trade with us during the Revolutionary War, despite British opposition. Toward that end, she established the principle of armed neutrality on the high seas which has been so important a part of our policy ever since. Yet Catherine was vocal in her objections to our republicanism. Prior to the Civil War, differences pertaining to the boundaries of Russian Alaska were settled over the conference table. (The Russians had had outposts as far south as California.) During the Civil War, the appearance of Russian fleets on good-will missions in the ports of New York and San Francisco was one of the factors which pushed Britain back from the verge of intervention on the side of the South. Yet Lincoln's democracy and Alexander's monarchy were poles apart. Afterward, we bought Alaska on terms which were mutually satisfactory.

Thus, the lessons of history: *completely opposing social systems have never brought Russia and America into conflict, while the coincidence of national interests has been so marked as to make us friends for 170 years, and allies in the two greatest wars either nation has ever fought.*

What of today? A recapitulation of the fears with regard to Russian policy expressed by the American press during the war years is some measure of the lack of importance of the alarums being sounded today. Moscow did not ally itself with Hitler to conquer the world, or with Hirohito to carve up Asia. It did not stop fighting when its own territory had been freed, and preserve Hitler as a buffer against the Western world. It did not incorporate into the Soviet Union the territories occupied by its troops in their pursuit of the Wehrmacht. It did not encourage Togliatti, Thorez, Rakosi, Pieck, Fischer, Dimitrov, Pauker and Gottwald to set up Soviets in liberated Europe, nor have they tried to do so. It did not sit mourning its 10,000,000 military and civilian war dead, leaving to us the bloody job of invading the Japanese mainland. Instead it engaged Japan in the largest scale fighting of the entire Pacific War. According to General Claire Chennault and Lord Louis Mountbatten its entry, rather than the atom bomb, was the decisive factor in bringing about the surrender at this time.

Finally, Moscow's relations with China have been so correct, even to the signing of the alliance with the emissaries of the recognized government at Chungking, that the Communist radio at Yenan had to declare that North China will not necessarily consider itself bound by treaties to which it was not a party. Although the text of the Sino-Soviet treaty has not been published at this writing, nor have the "agreements" on other "matters of mutual interest" which were discussed, it is a certainty that Moscow will favor an anti-fascist coalition government. That this will not take the form of undue interference in Chinese affairs is indicated by the steps obviously being taken on their own initiative both by Chungking and Yenan to improve their bargaining positions at the expense of the defeated Japanese. By the time this article reaches the reader Soviet or Mongolian troops will be in direct contact with the Chinese Communist forces at least, and the policies they then pursue will make the picture much clearer.

Perhaps the potentialities for postwar coöperation between ourselves and the USSR have been best demonstrated by the solution of the question of the disposition of Germany and Japan. What insuperable difficulties were supposed to have stood in the way of the delineation of occupation zones, the punishment of war criminals, the distribution of reparations and the determination of the political future of Germany! Yet Potsdam brought compromise agreements on all these issues. Thus it was demonstrated that getting along with Stalin was not a personal quality of President Roosevelt, but a reflection of the national interest of the American and British peoples and the demand for coöperation with Russia voiced at the last elections in both countries. Churchill's bitter speech on August 16 only emphasizes this. Likewise, Soviet agreement to the distasteful retention of the Japanese Emperor, and the appointment of a single, American, commander-in-chief for Japan indicates a willingness to recognize the facts of life in the Pacific.

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To this observer, the course of this war has demonstrated the ability of the USA and the USSR to get along on one ideological issue, but leaves another open. The one on which we have agreed is that fascism is a common enemy, dangerous both to the democratic-capitalist and the soviet-socialist ways of life. The one which remains open in practice (although in words it was settled at Teheran and Yalta), is whether we can agree to permit peoples freedom of choice between our two systems. At present that is not an issue. Both eastern and western Europe, including Britain, are moving, at various rates of speed, toward a system in which large landholdings are abolished, but distributed among the peasantry, large industry is nationalized, but small industry, private commerce and individual farming are not interferred with.

The countries of western Europe have not advanced very far toward that goal. This is largely due to de Gaulle's conservatism, Allied control over Italy, and Tory pressure in the Low Countries, and the unwillingness of the former resistance movements to counter these pressures by other than lawful means. In eastern Europe no attempt has been made to move beyond the system described above, nor can there be such an attempt for a decade or more. However, when industry has recovered and expanded, and the peasantry finds that individual land ownership and the abolition of feudalism do not automatically bring an end to all its troubles, there must be further changes. That new "European system" is neither capitalism as we know it, nor socialism as it exists in the Soviet Union. But anyone who has followed the history of the USSR knows that such a system can mark a transition toward socialism. It is a certainty that the Communist parties will try to persuade the people to move in that direction.

Suppose, out of a combination of the lessons of their own experience and admiration for the progress which everyone agrees Russia will make in the next decade, they turn in its direction, however gradually and peacefully? Will we permit it? Suppose, 20 years hence, the USSR attains an American standard of living and bids fair to go beyond it? Suppose, at the same time, we have not learned to cope with the distribution of the goods our system can produce, and we are in a chronic economic crisis? This is by no means inevitable, but it is very highly possible.

Under those circumstances there is a certainty that would-be American Hitlers would seek a solution of our problems, and, prior to that, the maintenance of our position *vis-à-vis* the encroachment of a growing socialist world, in war with the USSR. Those considerations have been for years the motive force in the thinking of the Hearsts, the Pattersons and McCormicks, and of so dangerous an advisor for evil as Herbert Hoover. The question then, as now, is whether the American people will grant every other people the right to determine its own destiny as it sees fit. Our history in general, the course of our relations with Russia in particular, and the fact that the American people in crisis has always solved its own problems and has not tried to pass the buck in the form of aggressive war, would tend to answer that question in the positive. But there is no question that the American counterpart of the monopolist, imperialist interests which brought Europe to catastrophe will attempt to answer it differently. The choice is up to us.

As for Russia, I for one can see no danger of aggressive war on her part under her present system. She has all the raw materials she needs, and is willing to sell us whatever we need in exchange for our machinery. Her system of raising purchasing power in proportion to production provides a boundless internal market. Sales abroad are made only for the purpose of paying for goods which must be purchased in order to fulfill the internal plan of production. Therefore there is no imperative drive for foreign markets. Her system creates no surplus capital incapable of profitable investment at home, and which must seek markets abroad. For all these reasons, she needs no colonies or spheres of influence except for reasons of strategic security.

It is not conceivable to me that the question of security outposts will be a cause of war when such major questions as the frontiers of Soviet occupation in Europe and Asia have been settled peacefully. Undoubtedly, there will be haggling over the Dardanelles, the Kiel Canal, perhaps the Kurile Islands, but these are petty by comparison to the issues already settled. So long as her economy continues to expand, as it undoubtedly will for decades to come, Russia grows stronger merely by sitting still. Therefore territorial expansion is not necessary.

The history of American-Soviet relations is a good portent for the future. We have been allies, and never enemies, despite differing social systems. We have a joint task in preventing the renewal of German and Japanese aggression, which should maintain our alliance. That is the declared main theme of Soviet foreign policy for the years ahead. Russia needs peace to rebuild and prosper. We need it because the ability to find great markets abroad, which is fundamental to our system, depends on the assurance that the long-term loans and credits we will have to extend to all the world will be paid back. And only a stable world can guarantee that. Within our country, the threat to peace comes from those whose economic policies and appeasement helped bring about this war. Their freedom of action has been increasingly restricted by the last four presidential elections. They must now be completely deprived of the power to "drift us," or force us, into war again.

WILLIAM MANDEL

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China's Civil Conflict

THE end of the most destructive international war in history brings us face to face with a civil war in China likely to devastate that country, wipe out any opportunity for a moderate, democratic solution, blight American chances for an expanded postwar market and make that area the main diplomatic plague-spot of the postwar world.

Japan's bid for surrender brought a new flare-up between Communist and Kuomintang forces as both rushed in to fill the politico-military vacuum left by collapsing Japanese power. There had been a long build-up for this and only two weeks before *Ta Kung Pao* had declared that "everyone trembles with fear at hearing the words 'civil war' " but that "the fact is that a form of civil war really does exist."

While those close to the Chinese scene have fearfully resigned themselves to internal strife, many American observers have been hopeful that the repeated conversations between Premier Stalin and Premier T. V. Soong may provide a means of achieving Kuomintang-Communist unity. This indicates a misunderstanding both of the character of the Moscow conferences and the role of T. V. Soong in Chinese political life. Premier Soong went to Moscow at the prompting of President Truman, who did not want any of the numerous Sino-Soviet territorial problems to impede Russia's entrance into the war. The Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship, probably including Russian recognition of Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria, with Russian transit rights on the Chinese Eastern Railway and port facilities at Port Arthur or Darien, has been announced. But this has not stopped the emerging civil war in China. Those who have placed hope on the views or visits of Premier Soong or Foreign Minister Wang-Shih-chieh fail to recognize that they are not the architects of Chungking's plans. They are men with little real power, their chief assets being their Western training and their ability to win friends and influence people in Washington and London.

The substance of power in Chungking lies in three groups: the "CC" clique which dominates the Kuomintang hierarchy and the whole network of Kuomintang-appointed government officials; the "Whampoa Group" of Kuomintang generals under General Ho Ying-chin; and the old-style bankers and speculators formerly dominated by H. H. Kung. The Generalissimo has been the willing prisoner and unifier of these reactionaries. Thus, he dismissed General Ho as War Minister last fall to appease American criticism but retained him in the more important position of Chief of Staff and subsequently appointed him to the strategic post of Commander-in-Chief of all Chungking ground forces. For some time the blueprint of these Kuomintang rightists has read somewhat as follows: The Chinese army, paced by a vanguard of American-trained and American-equipped troops and protected by an American air cover, was to retake the territories held by the Japanese. In these territories the plan has been to incorporate the Chinese puppet troops and thereupon fall upon the Communist-led border areas and obliterate the Eighth Route and New Fourth Route Armies. During this period the truth is to be kept from the outside world by heavy press censorship and accusations that the Communists have initiated the assaults.

The intention of the Kuomintang to ally itself with the collaborationists and their puppet troops has been apparent for some time. Leading Chinese officials have shown a sympathetic "understanding" of the motives of the pro-Japanese collaborationists while retaining a virulent hatred for the anti-Japanese regime at Yenan. They have hailed the example of Greece where leftists have been liquidated and pro-fascists amnestied. One of the outstanding examples of Chungking's willingness to welcome pro-Japanese traitors back into the fold was displayed on January 21, 1944, in *Yi Shih Pao*, authoritative Chungking Catholic newspaper published by Bishop Paul Yu-pin: "If the traitors are willing to turn over a new leaf," *Yi Shih Pao* solicitously declared, "we will forgive the past and allow them to reform. If Pu Yi or Wang Ching-wei broke away from the Japanese and served their country *at a later stage*, we would allow them once again to be Chinese and even give them freedom of assembly and speech for publication and for forming associations." [Italics mine. – A. R.]

From time to time foreign observers in Chungking have been startled to come face to face with Chinese known to have gone over to the Nanking puppet regime. It has been reported that Wu Kai-hsien, in the past a member of the "CC" clique and more recently a prominent member of the collaborationist Nanking regime, has visited Chungking and proposed that the Kuomintang forces coöperate actively with the puppet troops in a vigorous anti-Communist campaign, in order to suppress the Eighth Route and New Fourth Route Armies. Perhaps it was visits such as this that enabled the Generalissimo, in his interview with American newsmen in June, to declare with confidence and approval that the 800,000 Chinese puppet troops would come over to the Chungking side when Japan's power crumbled.

Most of these puppets consist of units that went over to the Japanese under Kuomintang officers or were organized by Kuomintang officers who had already gone over. In 1943 General Pang Ping-hsun took 70,000 Kuomintang troops over to the Japanese

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side. According to Communist statistics, in North China in 1944 alone 150,000 Kuomintang troops went over to the Japanese to be used against the Communists. Leading Chungking spokesmen have defended these deserters as "patriotic," declaring that they would be found back on the Kuomintang side when the final struggle against the Communists takes place. Some Chinese newspapers have even dignified these desertions by the theory of the "roundabout way of saving the country," claiming that they were doing Chungking a favor by keeping the Communists in check while being paid and armed by the Japanese!

The proof of Chungking's plan to utilize the puppets came even before Japan's capitulation was complete. On August 10, the day the Japanese request for surrender was made, the Generalissimo called upon the traitorous puppets "to redeem themselves" by remaining in the areas to which they had been assigned by the Japanese. They were expressly "forbidden to move from the assigned areas without special orders" but were ordered "to preserve peace and order and protect civilians." Since about nine-tenths of the puppet troops have been assigned by the Japanese to areas surrounding the border areas, it is clear that this order was meant to keep the puppet troops from yielding arms or territory to the Communist-led forces and to protect the officials in puppet-held towns from the vengeance of the guerrillas.

The Communists have for some months indicated foreknowledge of the plan for a Chungking-Nanking alliance against Yenan, and have planned to meet it along political and military lines. At the seven-week-long Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which closed on June 11, Mao Tse-tung called for a "conference of peoples' representatives from all parts of liberated China." According to the Yenan radio this congress' purpose is to unify the "anti-Japanese work" of the almost 100 million people in 19 liberated areas and also to "help the people in the anti-Japanese and the democratic movement in Kuomintang-controlled areas and the underground-army movement of the people in Japanese-occupied territory. . . ." This conference is scheduled to meet early this fall. If it meets under conditions of open civil war—as seems likely—it may very well declare the autonomy of North China and Manchuria and defend it against the "invasion" of Kuomintang troops.

The Communist-led armies, under General Chu Teh, have also made preparations. They comprised some 800,000 regulars last December but were reported to have increased to 900,000 by May and may now surpass one million. During the last stages of the war they increased their store of arms and decreased the number of the Kuomintang's potential allies by concentrating their attacks on Chinese puppet troops. They reacted quickly to Japan's surrender bid. On midnight of August 10 (the day of Chiang's order to the puppets) General Chu Teh ordered the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies to arrange for the disarming of Japanese and puppet troops in the zones where they were operating. Chungking immediately responded by charging collaboration between the Communists and the Japanese!

It is likely that American readers are going to get a very murky picture of this emerging civil war, and one slanted heavily toward Chungking. Censorship and press regimentation have reached new heights in Chungking during the last three months. No more reporters have been permitted to go to Yenan, and critical American reporters have even been prevented from returning to Chungking. Harold Isaacs, *Newsweek's* able China correspondent, and Darrell Berrigan, the New York *Post's* experienced Far Eastern editor, have been banned as a result of past criticism of the Kuomintang regime. Howard Fast, who wanted to fly into China to report for *Coronet* and *Esquire*, was stopped in India by the regulation that he would have to remain in China a minimum of six months. The Chungking edition of the Shanghai *Post and Mercury* has been forced to fold by arbitrary censorship. New regulations for foreign correspondents in China require them to apply every six months for a renewal of credentials. The regulations provide for withholding new credentials from correspondents who write material that the Chungking government construes as maliciously critical *even if it is written while outside China and beyond the jurisdiction of the Chinese censors!*

The United States cannot avoid a certain amount of responsibility for this imminent civil war. In Europe we gave arms to all factions fighting the common enemy. When we knuckled under to the Kuomintang last fall and refused to give the Yenan armies even the captured Japanese material they requested, in effect we gave the Kuomintang the go-ahead signal for a war of extermination against the border regions. We also alienated Yenan. Civil war in China may endanger Russo-American friendship. If Yenan declares the autonomy of North China and Manchuria after Soviet troops have broken the back of Japanese resistance in Manchuria, we may find Soviet and American troops arrayed on opposite sides of the civil war. We may also pay economic consequences. A protracted civil war would almost certainly blight China's recovery as a market for American goods. If the Kuomintang rightists win out, China's postwar economy would parallel that of prewar Japan, both in character and menace. China would retain its semi-feudal agriculture, build enough heavy industries to make it a military power and develop a network of light industries which would use coolie labor to replace Japan as the great exporter of cheap textiles. The result: an impoverished and rebellious peasantry in China coupled with bitter trade rivalry and the undercutting of Western labor standards.

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China would also be impoverished by the loss of the small but important body of moderate and democratic pro-American intellectuals in Kuomintang China who have stuck to their beliefs. Most of them, centered in the Democratic League, have opposed the regimentation and profiteering of the Chungking regime and supported the agrarian reforms and coalition regime advocated by Yenan. If Chungking enters upon full-scale civil war, it seems likely that all of these opposition elements will be silenced.

There is still time to halt this civil war, provided that we recognize the dangers fully and move decisively to stop it. Chungking is completely at the mercy of Washington, diplomatically, economically and in military terms. American diplomacy greased the way for Premier Soong to see Premier Stalin. American gold bolsters the Chinese economy and American economic aid is required to modernize post-war China. We have the right, even the obligation, to see that our assistance is not used for civil war or to establish a regime which will endanger the future peace and prosperity of the Pacific. ANDREW ROTH

Wyatt of Louisville

LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY, is an interesting community at the present moment for at least two reasons. One of these is the effort it is now making to buy and operate its local electric-light plant. The other is the man who is the central figure in this fight—Mayor Wilson W. Wyatt.

The plant is owned by the Louisville Gas and Electric Company, a subsidiary of Standard Gas and Electric, which is now going through the slow and painful process of being divorced from the parent company under the direction of the SEC. The L. G. and E. is usually valued at about $85 million; its gross revenues last year from its gas and electric services were $20 million and its net operating income, after taxes, $4 million. Under municipal operation, after making deduction to allow for the taxes (other than federal) that the L. G. and E. now pays, the city would have a net operating revenue of $7 million or $8 million annually before payments because of the debt; and after these, there would still be from $3 million to $4 million. This could be used for any or all of three purposes: to reduce rates, to reduce taxes or for miscellaneous municipal purposes. Of course, as soon as the entire purchase price had been paid, the sum available for these three purposes would rise to $7 million or $8 million.

I am not sure how the experts on electricity of the Tennessee Valley Authority, a few miles south of Louisville, would view the idea of using revenue from the L. G. and E. for miscellaneous municipal purposes. These widely experienced specialists are in general opposed to keeping electric rates high and using the profits to pay for other municipal services whose costs should be met from the general tax rates. I am pretty sure, however, that, laying aside the question of rates, the TVA men would approve of having Louisville own and operate its own electric-light system.

The owners of the L. G. and E. and their friends among private-utility men throughout the country are running true to form in their opposition to the plans of the city. In hearings before the SEC they have bitterly denounced Mayor Wyatt and the Louisville *Courier-Journal* for favoring the plan. They accuse the Mayor and the newspaper editors of trying to depress the market for L. G. and E. shares, and thus reduce the value of the enterprise, a charge which is strongly denied. They also accuse the same individuals of coercion and intimidation in general. The L. G. and E. officials seem to show the curious blindness to the public reaction and the failure to recognize the tendency of the times which mark nearly all private-utility men, all over the country.

Even if the way were cleared for Louisville to buy the L. G. and E., the action would not take place in a hurry. The Board of Aldermen, which is the Louisville equivalent for a city council, is Republican by eleven to one, while Mayor Wyatt is a Democrat. Not all of the eleven show the passionate devotion to so-called private enterprise which characterizes most Republicans, but undoubtedly a majority of them do. However, a municipal election will take place this autumn, at which a new administration will be chosen. Thanks largely to Mayor Wyatt's ability to dramatize public issues for the citizens of Louisville, there seems little doubt that the incoming Board of Aldermen will favor the purchase of the L. G. and E., by a heavy majority.

The Mayor will not be a candidate to succeed himself. The Kentucky State Constitution, written many years ago by a legislature overwhelmingly rural in its makeup, contains a clause saying that no Kentucky mayor may serve two successive terms and that no official of the state or any part thereof may have a salary larger than $5,000 a year—except the governor, who can have $10,000. To a Kentucky farmer several generations ago (or even today, for that matter) $5,000 a year seemed affluence like that of coal-oil Johnny. Very few Kentucky mayors have ever had the hardihood to try it again, even after the necessary lapse of one or more terms.

Mayor Wyatt goes out of office with the cordial good wishes of something like 65 percent of the citi-

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zens of Louisville (or 73 percent if you exclude those who expressed no opinion, as is customarily done in quoting such figures). That is an extraordinarily high proportion for a Democrat in a border town. Although at present, nearly all of the members of the Board of Aldermen are Republicans, this is more or less accidental and certainly no reflection on the Mayor. When he was elected in 1941, the twelve members of the Board elected with him were all Democrats. But the aldermen serve only two years as against the mayor's four. In '43, the aldermanic race was highly incidental to the race for Governor of Kentucky. A Republican was elected governor and carried with him the entire board in several cities including Louisville. Since then one alderman has resigned and his place was taken by a Democrat.

The figure on Wyatt's popularity comes from a survey made by Elmo Roper, who conducts the public-opinion inquiries for *Fortune*. That Mayor Wyatt is popular is not surprising, as I discovered when I dropped off in Louisville recently on a transcontinental journey, to have a look at the town and at him. Wyatt is tall, energetic, straightforward, highly articulate. He has a good sense of humor and knows enough not to take himself too seriously (or too lightly, either, which can also be a fault in a public man). He is certainly one of the three or four most important figures to emerge in American political life in the last few years; and it is easy to predict that his public career will continue after his term as mayor ends next autumn.

It would be valuable to know what it is that causes a man like Wyatt to get interested in politics. A Louisville product, he came from modest surroundings. He attended the University of Louisville for one year and then, while working for the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, went to evening classes at the Jefferson School of Law. Before long (he is still only 39) he had fought his way up to a practice, as a corporation lawyer, of $35,000 or $40,000 a year. (Among his clients was the L. G. and E., which is hardly likely to retain his services again, if it should continue in business and he should resume the practice of law.) When the Democrats asked him to run for mayor in 1937, he declined; but when they asked him again in 1941, he said yes, and received the largest vote ever obtained by any Democratic mayor of Louisville.

The fight to buy the L. G. and E. is only one of half a dozen interesting enterprises which Mayor Wyatt has initiated. He has an ability for dramatizing public questions for his constituents, over the radio, on the platform and in print, and he has obtained public coöperation in this way. Herewith are a few examples:

The Republican-controlled Board of Aldermen decided some time ago to cut the tax rate in Louisville, in spite of the fact that the city patently could not afford any such cut. With the usual cynical contempt of the average city politician for public intelligence, they decided the people of Louisville would look only at the few pennies saved for their pocketbooks and ignore the harm that would accrue to the city's institutions. The Board of Aldermen slipped over the action while Mayor Wyatt was taking a one-day business trip to Chicago. When he got back he promptly took to the radio to tell the people of Louisville the meaning of what was going on. He pointed out that the tax reduction would save the average individual householder only about ten cents a week; and then he gave a list of the city institutions, such as orphanages, hospitals and homes for the aged, and recited the thousands of dollars that their respective budgets would have to be cut. A couple of days later, Louisville saw a spectacle not often witnessed in any American community: many hundreds of responsible citizens storming the meeting place of the Board of Aldermen to demand that their taxes should not be cut. The result was, on the whole, a victory for Mayor Wyatt. The Board of Aldermen did not rescind their action entirely, but they passed an amending ordinance, juggling appropriations around so as to prevent most of the disastrous consequences which had been threatened.

One interesting aspect of Wyatt's career has been his relationship to Louisville Negroes. Before taking office he had not been conspicuous among defenders of the rights of the Negro race; but as soon as he was sworn in, he began a campaign to get justice for them. He has worked hard and successfully to obtain equal pay for equal work. He has fought to see that the Negro population gets its fair share of public housing facilities which have been erected with the aid of the federal government. The directors of the county hospital had been very much pleased with themselves because the proportion of beds for Negro sufferers with tuberculosis was in accordance with the proportion of Negroes in the entire population; Wyatt pointed out that the tuberculosis rate among Negroes is enormously higher than among whites and insisted that beds be allocated on a basis of need and not mere population statistics.

When, some time ago, Katherine Dunham and her troupe of Negro dancers played in Louisville, Negro residents of the city were excluded from the main floor of the theatre, causing Miss Dunham to remark in a curtain speech that she and her troupe would never play Louisville again under these conditions. Soon after, Marian Anderson was scheduled to sing in Louisville, and Mayor Wyatt took the lead in a project to make sure that no discrimination was practised. Seats were made available to Negroes at all prices, and when

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a white purchaser selected seats next to those already purchased by a Negro, he was notified of that fact. There were hardly any protests; the house was sold out, and Mayor Wyatt feels that a taboo has been broken. Obviously, in regard to Negroes he has not moved as fast as some people would like; but it is equally obvious that he has moved.

A bugbear to many mayors, all over the country, is needless duplication of city and county services. Even when the city is co-extensive with the county, politicians, for the sake of making as many jobs as possible, continue unnecessary and costly paralleling of services. Mayor Wyatt managed to break this bottleneck by a long and patient campaign of public education. He took to the radio and the platform to show the people of city and county alike how many new things they could do with the money saved by consolidation.

His tactfulness was also employed in putting through a city-planning program. In many communities, hostility grows up between businessmen and city-planning commissions; the former often think of the latter as a lot of dreamy idealists with no conception of the needs of business, intent on driving through their plans at whatever cost; and the city planners are inclined to reciprocate in the same spirit. Wyatt solved this difficulty by bringing in the business community at the very beginning. The Louisville Area Development Association is a coöperative body supported partly by the city and county, partly by local business, partly by the Louisville trade unions. It has scores of committees working on such items as flood control, express highways, automobile parking, parks, playgrounds and hospitals. At least 500 businessmen are members of one or another of these committees, and the result is that when a plan is put forward, it meets no opposition. All possible opponents are already committed to it.

Although his term in office is about to end, as I have suggested, I don't believe Wyatt's public service is over. Kentucky will presently need a new governor; already it needs a United States senator to take the place of the ineffable Happy Chandler. I don't think I am under any illusions about the importance of individual good men in the improvement of the American system of government; but I can't help feeling that if we could persuade a couple of hundred other successful men to do what Wyatt did when he ran for office, our political landscape would look a lot brighter.

BRUCE BLIVEN

Our Surplus Billions

EARLY IN THIS WAR, military and civilian officials started planning for the disposal of the surplus properties the government would own when the war was over. They knew the mess that had been made of this job after the last war, and they did not intend to have it repeated. Much effort has gone into organizing a surplus-disposal program, but there is still no certainty that the waste and the scandal of the last time will not be repeated.

President Truman and Reconversion Director Snyder are so worried over this part of the demobilization job that they both have asked Congress to review the handling of our surpluses to date and centralize the responsibility for disposal in a single administrator. Congress will take up the surplus-property question early in the fall and will almost certainly amend the present Act in some respects. But it probably won't write anything into the Act about the kind of men needed to administer it. And that is the most important thing about the disposal of our surpluses.

After the first World War, the Army had no plans for surplus disposal until 20 days after the Armistice when it frantically pulled 150 officers in to draw up a disposal program. In the four years following 1918, they sold off properties which had cost the government $3.75 billion for about $1.5 billion, with the most slipshod management. Every war agency handled its own sales, with no central supervision.

This time, President Roosevelt called on Congress in October, 1942, to study the problem. They were still discussing and considering in February, 1944, when the Baruch-Hancock report on postwar problems appeared. President Roosevelt acted on Baruch's recommendations on the handling of surpluses immediately by issuing an executive order, creating the Surplus War Property Administration as a policy-forming agency within the Office of War Mobilization with Will Clayton, the Texas cotton broker, at its head. The Clayton organization was soon caught in a storm of protest over the rules it laid down, clearly favoring the big man over the small, fostering monopoly rather than diversified ownership of industry.

Congress was then forced to go to work on surplus-property legislation of its own. For weeks, the two houses scrapped, mainly over Will Clayton and ways of assuring preferences for small buyers. The act finally passed last October was a confused compromise. A three-man board was substituted for a single administrator, primarily as a way of getting rid of Clayton, but the actual selling of surpluses was left in the hands of the regular government agencies, with the board confined to policy-making and supervision, in line with the elaborate system of preferences and safeguards written into the act by Congress.

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Liberals were deeply interested in the selection of the members of the new board, for under the new act the fresh personalities clearly were to have nearly as much power as Clayton had had under the executive order. The slate the President sent to Congress was also a compromise between the progressive forces and the Jesse Jones forces; former Senator Guy Gillette of Iowa, former Governor Robert Hurley of Connecticut, and Edward Heller, a wealthy New Dealer from California—two defeated Democratic politicos and a little known liberal, untried in public office. This board was certainly not of the caliber needed for one of the most complex and technical operations in the government.

The SWPB staff soon sized up all three of the board members as honest men who intended to do their best, but from the first, Chairman Gillette was obviously unsuited to the detailed, specialized work which fell to him. Hurley tried to make up in energy for his lack of knowledge of the problems with which the board was dealing. Heller was the man best qualified to handle surplus problems, but not being a fighter by nature, he found it hard to hold his own with determined special interests and was inclined to be overcautious in his actions. The man who was chosen to serve as Administrator of the SWPB found it easy to operate under such a board, for he had been trained by that super-smooth operator, General Brehon Somervell, in the Services of Supply. Colonel Arthur E. Howse had been a prominent Kansas businessman and Republican before the war. He had been an efficient member of Somervell's staff, and after he was named administrator of the SWPB, his loyalty to the General seemed to continue. Howse brought man after man from Somervell's organization into key spots in the SWPB, and some observers who remembered how important a part infiltration had played in the Army's successful war against the WPB began to fear what might happen to the SWPB.

The board had difficulty agreeing on the interpretation of parts of the act. Once they invited four senators and four representatives, who had helped draft it, down to interpret the veterans'-preference provision and got nine opinions from the eight men because one changed his mind during the session. The armed forces are the owning agencies of perhaps two-thirds of the properties for which a market can readily be created, and they were reluctant to declare items for sale as surplus and slow to sell them after they had been so declared. Colonel Howse's Army contacts did not seem to do the SWPB any good. This made the board's record look bad. There was criticism of the large, and increasing current surpluses, but no account was taken of the fact that now, for instance, out of the $2 billion worth of current surplus, $1.5 billion is in military airplanes, most of which should be scrapped though the Army refuses to do so. The SWPB was supposed to have responsibility for disposals made, but the actual sales were completed by disposal officers whose first responsibility was to the heads of the various agencies by which they were employed.

Senator O'Mahoney's War Contracts Subcommittee is expected to begin hearings shortly on the whole surplus problem, taking up all questions the owning and disposal agencies want considered as well as those the Senate has in mind. All the agencies involved have been asked to assign liaison officers to work with the Senate committee on amendments. The Contracts Settlement Act was worked out by this procedure, and O'Mahoney has told the agencies he wants to see "whether it can be applied with like success to the amendments of the Surplus Property Act." It is agreed that the President's request for a single administrator will be approved, and generally believed that Stuart Symington of the Emerson Electric Co., St. Louis, the new chairman Truman chose to succeed Gillette, will be appointed. In that case, Hurley and Heller would surely leave the SWPB. Howse has resigned and is not being replaced, so Symington would be the real boss. There is a good chance that Symington is able to do this job. If he is to have a chance at it, he should sign up for the duration of the task, not just for so long as it pleases him to stay, and he should start looking for a corps of good assistants for each of the special industrial fields on which surplus disposal touches.

Few other changes in the act are really required. Experience has already revealed some deficiencies—Gillette suggested several following his resignation—which can easily be corrected in the coming amendments. Heller and Hurley will have other valuable suggestions to make later on, whether they go or stay. Most of those who hope to see our surplus property produce the most it can toward a full-employment economy feel that it would be wasteful to create a single new agency to handle surpluses now, as is provided in the Stewart bill pending in the Senate. The important thing, as stated in it, is that "the responsibility shall be in the Board." Any move to rewrite the whole act will merely bring on the vultures from the NAM who would love another chance to eliminate the sections giving preference to states and municipalities and providing for review by the Attorney General on purchases of $1 million or more for monopoly violations. The Congress should clarify its intent on control so as to give Surplus Property a strong hand in demanding coöperation from the armed forces in this postwar period. Unless they will deliver surplus stocks in the form of suitable merchandise to the small purchaser, SWPB's chance to live up to this important objective is zero.

What is needed in surplus property disposal now is not legislation but courageous administrators who are not afraid to go ahead, even if they make mistakes.

Washington HELEN FULLER

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Washington Notes

New Faces in the Capital

THE SECOND reorganization of the Department of State in less than a year is under way. This one promises to be much more thorough, and to mean a great deal more, than the reorganization last December by Roosevelt and Stettinius. It is ironic that under Truman and Byrnes the prospects are for a more progressive and enlightened organization than ever existed under Roosevelt.

Already two extreme conservatives placed in the Department by Mr. Roosevelt—Under-Secretary Joseph C. Grew and Assistant Secretary Julius C. Holmes—have been retired. To the surprise of everyone, Dean G. Acheson, the man around whom progressives in the Department have rallied, has been named Under-Secretary.

Acheson's position will be all the more important because Byrnes will be absent frequently and Acheson will be Acting Secretary. Like many of the ablest men in government, Acheson was eager to return to his law firm. He has been paid $9,000 a year as Assistant Secretary, yet he has been obligated to lead an active social life. It has cost him money, and unlike his predecessors in the post of Under-Secretary he is not wealthy. As Under-Secretary he will receive $10,000, but still no expense allowance. To persuade Acheson to become Under-Secretary, Byrnes must have had to promise him a free hand.

Acheson is no flaming liberal, but he is well left of center in his economic and political thinking, and he is one of the most intelligent and learned officials in Washington. Despite his intelligence and liberalism, he is popular on Capitol Hill. He is the man most responsible for extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. He has handled many other bills relating to international organization. The reactionaries in the Department thoroughly dislike Acheson, and his elevation was a terrific blow to them. On the credit side of the new administration, too, is the high place given Benjamin V. Cohen of the old team of Corcoran and Cohen. He now is Assistant to the Secretary—actually right-hand man to Byrnes.

The resignation of Holmes removes one of the staunchest reactionaries ever to hold a high place in government. It was Holmes, incidentally, who directed the fight against the six persons arrested on charges of espionage; a federal grand jury has now refused to return indictments against three of the six and has returned a much lighter charge than espionage against the other three.

On the debit side of the new State Department administration must be placed the loss of Assistant Secretary Archibald MacLeish. He has not had great power in the Department, but he has labored nobly to acquaint the American people with the facts of international life. MacLeish's successor has not been named, and in the meantime Byrnes is relying upon Walter Brown, former Washington correspondent for some South Carolina newspapers, who was with Byrnes in the Office of War Mobilization, for advice on information policy. Brown's ideas on public relations are as up to date as those of a fourteenth-century monk. Although widely known among the correspondents here, he is about the most uncoöperative press agent in the city.

One of the biggest and most significant postwar congressional fights will be over the question of whose taxes to reduce first. When Henry Morgenthau Jr. was Secretary of the Treasury, he was in constant battle with Congress. The politicians said that he did not know how to get along with the statesmen on the Ways and Means, and Finance Committees. What they meant was that he wanted progressive tax legislation, while the majority in Congress wanted tax bills written by the Chamber of Commerce.

Fred M. Vinson, the new Secretary, was once a leading member of the Ways and Means Committee—one of its few liberal members. But Vinson, so they say on Capitol Hill, is a regular party man, a good politician. He speaks the language of Congress. He will get along with Congress.

Don't be too sure. Vinson is going to run into almost as much trouble as Morgenthau did. He will be more politic, but where the shooting starts is over tax policy. Vinson will be for progressive tax legislation, and he will have to fight for high taxes for a long time to come. Congress will want to cut taxes fast. That is the popular thing to do. Vinson will ask for substantially higher rates than Congress will be willing to impose and the fight will begin.

Corporations already have been given some tax relief, and they will demand much more when work begins on the new tax bill this fall. Undoubtedly there are good arguments for rewriting the corporate tax law, but there are better arguments for modernizing the whole tax structure.

President Truman has not yet completed the reorganization of his cabinet. Stimson will leave almost immediately. Ickes will leave soon. Even Forrestal will retire before long, and probably be succeeded by Assistant Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan, whose chief qualification seems to be that he is a good politician.

The only holdover from the Roosevelt cabinet will be Secretary of Commerce Wallace, and his influence will be important only in a negative sense. His hands are pretty well tied. But if he should ever get mad enough to quit, he could cause a lot of trouble.

The resignations that have been published by cabinet officers and other high officials all follow the same pattern. The end of the war has given a new twist to some of them. Also, the replies from the President are all the same: "I hate to see you leave and I will call on you for advice in the future."

A little more frankness would be welcome.

Notes.—Senator Byrd surprised a lot of people the other day by demanding a 40-hour week for all federal employees. Could it be that Byrd is beginning to take the side of the worker? Not at all. He explained his position beautifully. "We should go back to a 40-hour week, with no overtime," he said. "This will save the taxpayers over two billions annually, as compared to the 48-hour week." . . . At his press conference last week the President said he regarded the Wagner-Murray Full Employment Bill as "must" legislation. Most of the papers ignored his statement.

Washington T. R. B.

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International Notes

Emperor, Zaibatsu, Militarists

SNAP JUDGMENTS about the Emperor question in Japan are now being made in editorial offices, cocktail lounges, street corners and college classrooms. Learned authorities —historians, anthropologists, clergymen—will soon debate the pros and cons of whether the Emperor is a war criminal, an innocent fool or an untouchable saint. We are obviously confused. We are perplexed because we refuse to consult the only experts who should know: democratic Japanese. What do they think about their Emperor?

An article, "Relationship of the Emperor and the *Zaibatsu* to the Militarists," by Ken Mori, member of the Communist-led Japanese People's Emancipation League (JPEL), was recently made available by the Japanese American Committee for Democracy in New York City. It asks whether the overthrow of the Emperor and the *Zaibatsu* (monopolists) is an indispensable part of a democratic program for Japan. It assumes that the present morale and demands of the people in Japan should determine the program. It further assumes that it should be limited to minimum objectives, so that it may be acceptable to workers, peasants, intellectuals, small and middle capitalists alike.

Who, then, are Japan's main war criminals? The article takes issue with those who hold that the *Zaibatsu*—especially those capitalists who became enriched through the armament program since the Manchurian War in 1931—instigated the militarists and supported them with all their power, that the true cause of the war is to be found in their desire for profits, and that not only the militarists, but also the Emperor and the *Zaibatsu* should be overthrown. Although agreeing in principle, the article points out that the Emperor, the *Zaibatsu* and the militarists, "though compromising and coalescing with each other, contradict and antagonize each other to a more or less degree." The question as to who are the war criminals, therefore, "boils down to the question of who possesses the real political power in Japan."

According to the Japanese constitution, the Emperor has all the powers, military and political. Actually, however, the article continues, "the Emperor has, to a certain extent, already become a puppet. The 'will' of the Emperor is today dictated by the militarists, the strongest force within the entire ruling cliques (or within the monarchial institution). The militarists monopolize the entire Japanese military machine, start and direct the war, put the bureaucracy at their own service, dictate politics, dominate state capital, and now together with the *Zaibatsu* extend their ruling power into the economic field."

Discussing then the relationship between the *Zaibatsu* and the militarists, the article emphasizes that "although the militarists protect the interests of the *Zaibatsu* (and the big landlords) and share the profits, the militarists themselves have their own interest and their own independent existence. Though the *Zaibatsu* participate and exercise great influence in politics, the political power is nevertheless possessed by the militarists."

The article then compares the militarists and the other ruling groups with a horse and its rider. The horse represents the former. On its back ride the Emperor, the big land owners and *Zaibatsu*. Quoting the proverb, "If you want to kill the man, you must kill the horse," the article concludes that "if we first kill the horse, it is not difficult to kill the riders falling off the horse one by one. But if you try to kill the horse and the riders at the same moment, this will clearly end in failure. This is the main reason for our not including the overthrow of the *Zaibatsu* and the Emperor in our program."

But there is another reason for not demanding the immediate overthrow of the Emperor, according to Mori:

> Due to the deceptive propaganda and education of the past 70 years, the Imperial family still has a semi-religious influence over the Japanese people. . . . Hence our fight against it requires a more careful method as compared with our attack against the militarists and the *Zaibatsu*. The main thing is to break down the superstition deeply rooted among the people. For this it is necessary to show the people, by means of concrete facts, the truth that the Emperor is the enemy of the people. The masses need long and patient enlightenment and education. If, however, we ignore these preparatory steps and merely cry for the overthrow of the Emperor, *we will merely incite the animosity and opposition of the people*. These are the bitter experiences we underwent in Japan in the past. . . . The first step in the overthrow of the Emperor and the monarchical institution is to crush first its main support, namely the militarists. This will render the Emperor powerless.

Mori's article also rejects the demand for complete overthrow of the *Zaibatsu* because it would mean confiscation of their property and would be tantamount to a socialist revolution. It is pointed out that while the overthrow of the *Zaibatsu* may mean elimination of a few big armament capitalists, it would also frighten other capitalists, "with the result that they will support the militarists with their full strength. Furthermore, it would cause the *petit bourgeoisie*, which should otherwise side with us, to waver, with the result that they become merely passive observers instead of participants in our movement."

This position does not preclude, of course, the article suggests, that individual *Zaibatsu*, found guilty of war crimes, should be punished. "Our policy toward the Emperor is the same. If the Emperor identifies his fate with the militarists, we must expose his crimes before the people and overthrow him with the militarists." But, the article asks, "if those who now commit war crimes with the militarists should later realize their mistakes and abandon the militarists or dissociate themselves from them, what should we do? As the *Ta Kung Pao* [a Chungking newspaper which had criticized the program of the JPEL] points out, we would be lenient toward them. Will such a situation arise in the future? If it does, what content will it have? It is very difficult to predict at present. This is the reason why we only mention the militarists and their 'supporters', but do not specify who their 'supporters' are."

This is sensible advice from Japanese democrats. Before indiscriminately indicting a whole people, whole classes or an institution like monarchy, it may be well to listen to those who, in the long run, have to carry the burden of revamping a country like Japan whose culture is so very different from our own.

E. L. P.

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Coat of Navy Goo

THE MOST notable attraction in "Anchors Aweigh"—a long, fairly pleasant film with countless events and musical acts—is Gene Kelly's dancing. I think Kelly is the most exciting dancer to appear in Hollywood movies. He is all dancer, his whole body is involved in the dance, his attitude is lyrical, he seems to be completely transported from everyday existence when he dances and to want to do the best kind of dancing he knows. His dance efforts, like those of his acting, are made precisely, strongly and are seldom blurred or mechanical. All of these talents of energy and spirit enliven routines that are often composed of stock dance steps that build limited and minor designs. He does three carefully rounded, plot-heavy dances in "Anchors Aweigh," which are, like his dances in "Cover Girl," particularly designed for movies. The best of these is a cute, ingenious, unified sequence showing Kelly in a make-believe world of animated cartoon animals. He is good in this at fashioning his movements and employing a high querulous voice to make himself one with the animals and their kingdom; he wears a wonderful variation of a sailor's uniform; the animals are made very appealing, especially the gloomy mouse he teaches to dance; and the scene is played in an unreal, milk-white light that seems right for a make-believe world and gives the event a warm, clean, gay quality.

The most likeable, human and interesting person in the movie is Frank Sinatra, even though he still acts as though he were sticking to what he had just been shown how to do and feels no confidence that he will be able to copy the action. He is cast well as a shy sailor from Brooklyn, named Clarence, who has spent most of his life in a boys' choir and the ship's library, and who hangs on every word of his friend Joe Brady (Kelly), hoping to discover how to be a great lover. He plays the part in an earnest, unpretentious, well-wishing way—like a person trying to show how thankful he is even to be allowed in the movie with the other players—that is exactly right for the role. He also looks as if he was raised in New York, has a good, dry New Yorker's voice, and manages to steal more scenes from Kelly than he loses to this actor, who is one of the most aggressive, unerring players in Hollywood. He does it mainly on his extraordinary face, that is handsome, ugly, tough and commiserating at the same time, but also because he is artless, as most non-actors are in their first movies.

In spite of Kelly's dancing, Sinatra, and some razz-matazz song-and-dance duets performed by Kelly and Sinatra, I think you will find the movie lacks a good song, has a number of long dull stretches and could be a lot less puerile. The puerility is the characteristic of a production by Joe Pasternak, who makes modern fairy tales about lush, very young girls (in this one she is Kathryn Grayson) seeking musical careers, and getting them by means of a half dozen improbable circumstances. His movies show young women successfully, happily doing everything from bearing babies to running USO canteens, though they look as if they had never seen the outside of a milk bottle. They seem to have been grown by the same process that makes Technicolor, and while they bask through the film in the knowledge of their perfect loveliness the director smears their prettiness over your face as though you were near-sighted. Though the plot generally concerns the career of a young person in serious music, a Pasternak film hasn't to my knowledge ever touched serious music in any sense except the financial. In the interest of making the music entertaining many of the musical sequences end in gags, and performers are given gestures to make during their performances that show they are not only artists but regular fellows. For instance, in "Anchors Aweigh" José Iturbi conducts while holding a pipe in one hand and making a sign with his other hand which, combined with a wink, signifies that the conducting is going o.k.

MANNY FARBER

The Bandwagon

Peace is Wonderful

The war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage. – *Emperor Hirohito in his broadcast to the Japanese people announcing the surrender.*

PEACE IN OUR TIME
Since Eighty-nine
—Washelli Cemetery

– *Street-car advertisement in Seattle, Washington.*

If government is to furnish jobs for all continuously, it must confiscate all property and industry and go into business to earn the money to pay to public employees—it couldn't tax people enough to provide jobs for all and leave anything for the taxpayer to conduct business with. Hitler's Germany would be a kindergarten compared with the tyranny that would develop in any country that provided jobs for all. – *From an editorial in the Berkeley, California,* Daily Gazette.

Justice for All

Mrs. Helen Chucka, 27, was sentenced to six months for allowing her two small sons to run nude in public; Mrs. Geraldine Jenke, 22, received an identical sentence for abandoning her five children. – *Caption on a picture in the Washington* Daily News.

On the Home Front

Last week the beautiful blond daughter of Mrs. George Roscoe Suton and Theodore Frothingham Jr., prominent member of Boston's Back Bay colony, spent practically every day trousseau hunting with her future husband's first wife. . . . "I thought Peggy was awfully sweet to give me the benefit of her marital experience with George," opined Elinor. "We've had a regular routine every day this week. Shopping until 1, luncheon at 21, a show in the afternoon, cocktails at the Ambassador Gardens, looking over our purchases in the evening and meeting George here for dinner at night." – *From Charles Ventura's society column in the New York* World-Telegram.

That All-Out Effort

CIVILIANS! ALL theatres are out of bounds to Military Personnel. so NOW is the time, day or night, to see this startling, authentic movie, without crowding. – *Advertisement in the Honolulu* Advertiser.

Our readers are invited to contribute to this column; $1 will be paid for each item used. Address Bandwagon, care of the New Republic. *Please enclose the original clipping.* – THE EDITORS

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Correspondence

Dixie Against Bilbo

SIR: A note to assure you that there's more than one Southerner who is ashamed of Bilbo and his foul tongue. The people he abuses die so he may have the privilege. I pray that more of Dixie wakes up in time!

Silsbee, Texas SGT. T. I.

Labor's Victory and Us

SIR: I wish I could convey to you some feeling of the joy that has come over people with Labor's victory. I can't pretend to be a competent observer, for I do not frequent the London gin-palaces (I think that is where *Time's* correspondent gets his idea about the apathy with which the people regarded the election). However, I am lucky in knowing rather well a number of ordinary British soldiers, most of them in their early twenties, and to me there is something very touching in the way they have been going about all starry-eyed, still unable to believe that they are actually living under a Socialist Government and the Tory domination has been overthrown at long last. Certainly a Government has never entered office with more sincere popular good will behind it. I don't think any one expects miracles from it, for everyone realizes what a tremendous task lies ahead of it, but even here in so-called remote East Anglia one can feel the strong momentum of the people's will, ready to back up their Government in its great program. It's going to be a long, hard fight, and I think it is one that affects us Americans very closely, too.

Somewhere in England T/SGT. J. T. A.

Conscription in Peace Time

SIR: Military conscription in peacetime is a question which cannot be intelligently decided at this time. While there has been much vigorous pumping for a peacetime draft from various liberals, conservatives, military men and civilians, estimates for the size and kind of army we shall need must be made in reference to the existing world situation in regard to politics and technology.

It is somewhat early to assume that the United Nations Charter will be a failure or to gauge accurately what our military commitments will be under the Charter. Even granting the most morose assumptions, the possibility remains that a war waged with atomic energy may need fewer actual fighters than the one we are now ending.

The validity of the secondary argument for military conscription, the benefits of army life and discipline, is at least doubtful; and in any case, it is not sufficient reason for instituting a draft.

While the possibility of conscription must always be considered as a means of putting teeth into American foreign policy, it is to be hoped that that policy will be able to do without a large standing army to convince the world of its wisdom.

New York City NELLIE HUNTER

A Filipino Complains

SIR: What's wrong with the American dentists, anyway?

Several months before the Pacific war broke out, a Filipino dentist friend of mine tried to practice in California, but he was not even allowed to take the board examination. When he returned to the Philippines, he wrote me, "I have seen several American dentists in lucrative practice here. Isn't it funny, American dentists are allowed to practice in the Philippines, but Filipino dentists can't practice in America?"

Again there is the case of Dr. Belen G. Pardo, a Filipino woman dentist, She tried to practice in Washington, D. C., but her application to the Board of Dental Examiners was rejected on the ground that she is "not an American national and therefore would not meet the requirement of the Dental Board."

Then last June Dr. Pardo applied to the Children's Fund of Michigan as dentist for children—her specialty. In reply Dr. Kenneth R. Gibson wrote to Dr. Pardo saying that she could not be employed because—among other reasons—"there is the matter of your ancestry," to quote Dr. Gibson's own words. "In view of the fact that you are a graduate of a Philippine institution, I would hazard the guess that you are of Philippine or Japanese extraction. If this is the case, we would probably not employ you since the people of this state, especially its rural areas, would not accept you."

Did not Bataan and Corregidor prove to the world that we Filipinos are acceptable? Or don't the dentists of America know what we are fighting this war for?

Washington, D. C. P. C. MORANTTE

From The New Republic Mail Bag

The Reverend Louis Basso, Jr. of Traverse City, Michigan, writes in comment on Lucille B. Milner's article "Church, State and Schools" (the *New Republic*, August 13): "Beginning the day with the Lord's Prayer and the reading of the Scriptures is no more a violation of freedom of religion than is the dissemination of health information concerning the destruction of harmful mosquitoes an encroachment on the religious rights of the Jainists in India. No one can force us to accept truths to which we do not agree, even in secular education. . . . The current and successful plan in many communities of released school time for religious instruction is not for the purpose of bolstering up dwindling Sunday schools. Rather, it is an attempt by religious leaders to do a more adequate job of that which they cannot do in an hour on Sunday or whatever their day of worship may be."

J. Paul Williams of Mount Holyoke College, Mass., commenting on the same article, says, ". . . church and religion are not synonymous terms. The state will be indifferent to religion at its own peril; for the religion of an individual or a people is the values which are held most dear. Our nation is in a state of profound religious flux. Either we as a people will achieve a religious orientation which favors the democratic way of life, or the forces of the extreme Left, or more probably of the extreme Right, will shape the values for which Americans will live." He writes that Miss Milner "attacks . . . one solution of the problem; but her own implied solution is simply to preserve the *status quo*. Present arrangements for teaching religion are haphazard; many institutions take a hand in it, including the public schools (in the sense in which I use the term religion). But haphazardness in dealing with religion today means almost certainly a new religion tomorrow—and probably an unlovely one, as the nations about us amply demonstrate. Surely the public schools have a vital role to play in overcoming haphazardness in religious instruction. Unfortunately no one knows what kind of education in the public schools would be most effective for the furtherance of *democratic* values; America has not spent its research budget on that kind of problem. But surely the way not to do it is to preserve the solution of the problem of religious education which was worked out a hundred years ago."

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Books in Review

War and the Poets

FOR ALL his experience in editing anthologies, Oscar Williams is hardly the man you would choose to make a collection of *The War Poets*.[1] What he knows about the military trade is what he has read about it. Born in December, 1900, he was a few months too young to serve in the last war, and a little too old to serve in this one. He feels a great compassion for soldiers in the abstract. He describes them as "a wall of living young flesh, much of which will be mangled," and he laments because their sacrifices are always in vain; but he shows little understanding of their daily troubles, which are homesickness, utter boredom and military regulations. He thinks that modern warfare was described once and for all by Wilfred Owen; apparently he pictures it as proceeding forever in some rain-drenched Flanders:

> . . . a sad land, weak with sweats of dearth,
> Gray, cratered like the moon with hollow woe,
> And pitted with great pocks and scabs of plagues.
>
> Across its beard, that horror of harsh wire,
> There moved thin caterpillars, slowly uncoiled.
> It seemed they pushed themselves to be as plugs
> Of ditches, where they writhed and shriveled, killed.

"If it were the privilege of an editor to dedicate an anthology," Mr. Williams says, "this collection of verse would be dedicated to Wilfred Owen, who was the greatest war poet of World War I. His influence upon contemporary poets has been marked and his own poems are as true a commentary upon World War II as upon the war in which he lost his own life. His lesson that 'the Poetry is in the pity' has been well learned by poets of a later generation." Then, in a long introduction, Mr. Williams expounds the lesson in his own words.

Those words are sometimes ambiguous, and I may be doing him an injustice in my brief summary. He seems to be saying by indirection that all the true poets are opposed, not only to war in general, but also to fighting in this particular war. He implies that any soldier poet who expresses a willingness to die for a cause or a country deludes himself and his readers (or in Mr. Williams' words, "prevents the death rattle from being mentally heard"). Civilians should avoid reading such poems. Civilians who are poets have no right to be "deeply concerned over ravaged towns in Belgium or Czechoslovakia"; they should limit themselves to the fate of their own neighbors. The real poets are marked by an "exceptional sensitivity to the truth," and they are all in fundamental agreement about this war.

As an editor, Mr. Williams has selected "only such poems," he says, "as seem to me written with an emotional comprehension of all that war implies"—in other words, only the poems that confirm his own convictions. It seems to me that he should have approached the war poets with fewer preconceptions and more humility. He should have asked what they were writing, instead of answering that question in advance and then looking for evidence to support his answer. He should have gathered poems about the war without respect to the virtue or, as it seemed to him often, the viciousness of the opinions they expressed; he should have judged the poems by their interest, their vigor, their skill; and then, with new evidence before him, he should have drawn his generalities, which might have been very different from those in his present introduction. The anthology itself would have been different, and more valuable.

As it stands, the book consists of three sections that have to be considered separately. The first and shortest of these (45 pages) is devoted to the poets of the First World War. All the men included here were opposed to the war, except Rupert Brooke and Alan Seeger, both of whom are presented as horrible examples. Mr. Williams lectures their ghosts in his introduction. He contrasts them with Wilfred Owen, who told the truth about war, whereas Brooke and Seeger conjured up "a cloud of noble ecstatics."

What Mr. Williams forgets, here and elsewhere, is the simple matter of chronology. Brooke died in 1915. His grandiloquent language is hard for us to read, but he told the truth as he saw it, that is, he expressed the feelings of generous Englishmen during the first few months of fighting. Seeger was killed in 1916. He was a minor talent, but authentic: he expressed the feelings of American volunteers in the French army, after the battle of Champagne, when death had become their everyday companion. Owen was also writing patriotic poems in 1916, but later he put them aside. The mood he expressed in his lasting work was that of the British army after the useless butchery at Paschendaele, which the combatants on either side—says C. R. M. F. Cruttwell, the historian—"regarded as the culmination of horror. German writers have called it 'the supreme martyrdom of the war.' The rain was pitiless, the ubiquitous mud speedily engulfed man and beast if a step was taken astray from the narrow duckboards, upon which descended a perpetual storm of shells and gas. Some of the pictures in the Imperial War Museum preserve an aspect of the macabre grotesqueness of this blasted and mangled land"—and so also do the poems of Wilfred Owen.

There is a great deal of Owen's influence in the second and longest section of the anthology (220 pages), which is devoted to poems by men in the armed forces of Britain and America. "I feel very strongly," says Lieutenant Gavin Ewart of the Royal Artillery, in one of the many comments printed at the beginning of the volume, "that the best poems about war (modern war) have already been written—most of them by Wilfred Owen before he died in 1918.... All we can do is to provide footnotes, the small, detailed cameos of our own experience." Ewart's footnotes are good

[1] The War Poets: An Anthology of the War Poetry of the Twentieth Century, edited by Oscar Williams. New York: The John Day Company. 485 pages. $5.

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ones, fresh and cleanly observed, but some of his brother poets provide stereotypes instead. Looking out of tank turrets at an expanse of African sand, they imagine themselves to be still mired in Flanders. They use Owen's language, not because it tells the truth about their own struggle, but because it has become an obsession.

The British poets in this second section of the anthology are in general more thoughtful and more deeply affected by the war than are the Americans. Time after time they express the feeling that the old order in England was largely responsible for the catastrophe, and that everything must be changed at home. One finds in their work the same groundswell of emotion that, on a different level, led to the Labor victory. The American poets as a group are more concerned with technique and have less to say; the principal emotion they express is homesickness. Since the whole body of poetry represented in the second section is new to most of us, it is hard to say whether Mr. Williams has made the right selections. If any great or strikingly new poems have been written by English or Americans in the armed forces, he has managed to overlook them.

The third section (144 pages) is devoted to the work of civilians and contains the poems which, in Mr. Williams' opinion, are "most certain to communicate the realities of this war to the generations to come." These "realities," as we might expect, are selected in accordance with the editor's strict principles. They do not include the massacre of the European Jews (there is one poem about Hitler's earlier and milder persecutions), or the fall of France (except in one or two oblique references), or the invasion of Russia, or the shock of Pearl Harbor, or the pitiful wanderings of the refugees, or the rising of the conquered peoples, or the frenzy of liberation—not these or other realities that generations to come will read about in their schoolbooks without ever realizing what they meant to the human beings involved in them. Instead there are poems of guilt (and very good ones), poems of foreboding, poems about the hatefulness of all governments, poems about the isolation of poets from the mass of their countrymen, poems about the superiority of poets over warriors—good, bad and mediocre poems, honest and merely stylish poems, new poems and rather old poems the authors of which will be surprised to learn that they reveal the realities of this war. There is, for example, a fine ballad by W. H. Auden which first appeared in *On This Island* (1937):

> O what is that sound which so thrills the ear
> Down in the valley drumming, drumming?
> Only the scarlet soldiers, dear,
> The soldiers coming.

I read it long ago as an allegory of fear which might or might not apply, in a general way, to the coming war in Europe. Reprinted in the present context, without the date of its earlier publication, it acquires an exact meaning that the author never intended: it becomes the lament of a harried draft dodger. The other selections from Auden also give a one-sided picture of his work as a whole: you would think from reading them that the poet was a revolutionary pacifist instead of a Christian opposed to war in general but not to the war against Hitler. (Francis Hackett made this

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very natural mistake in reviewing the anthology for the New York *Times*.) Other poets suffer in much the same fashion. If you knew nothing about them except the extracts from their work that Mr. Williams has chosen, you would think that Archibald MacLeish, who has just resigned from the State Department; Louis MacNeice and William Empson of the British Broadcasting Corporation; Frederic Prokosch of the OWI and John Peale Bishop, late of the Office of Inter-American Affairs, were all of them revolutionary pacifists; that in fact all the real poets of our time agreed with Mr. Williams in his belief that the American dead of this war have died in vain.

I am not in the least concerned with the political effect of a volume like his. It would not be great in any case, and it is negligible now that the war is over. Another war like this one has been rendered impossible, not by pacts among nations, but simply by the atom bomb. If there is another war, it may well be fought without armies, by civilians pushing buttons in Omaha or San Diego and annihilating other civilians in Tashkent or Delhi. We must all be pacifists now, or the human race will perish. But granted that the race endures and that—the insects having been destroyed by DDT—the world is not turned over to a pair of yaks surviving in the mountains of Tibet, a book like Mr. Williams' might well have a harmful influence on poetry.

Its real fault is not misrepresenting poets' opinions, but the attempt to limit the portion of human life with which they are permitted to deal. They mustn't be jubilant in victory or sorrowful in defeat; they mustn't sing of political matters; they mustn't—oh, naughty children—express love for their own country or hatred or compassion for others; in wartime they must have no emotions except pity and rebellion. One effect of such restrictions would be to make poetry a very minor branch of literature. Another effect would be to separate poets more effectively than ever from the public, which feels other emotions in war and peace and would like to have them expressed. Mr. Williams complains in his introduction that good poetry isn't being read; but what he achieves with his anthology, which contains many good poems, is to make them seem unreadable.

MALCOLM COWLEY

Freud and Literature

Freudianism and the Literary Mind, by Frederick J. Hoffman. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 346 pages. $4.

As THE conjunctive title suggests, Mr. Hoffman's book is a study in influence. Here is Freud sinking his shaft underground; here are Lawrence, Joyce, Kafka, Mann and other imaginative writers sinking theirs. Did Freud give them the idea, or do they derive along with him from a tradition running back through Dostoievski and Schopenhauer to the Romantic perception that life is not preeminently reasonable?

This raises some nice questions of historical causality, of direct and indirect influence, to which Mr. Hoffman devotes a chapter of speculative theorizing; and it gets us involved, in the chapter on Sherwood Anderson, for instance, in what sounds like legal testimony in a plagiarism case. After much weighing of evidence, of Anderson's own statements and those of Floyd Dell, Trigant Burrow and other knowledgeable friends, we get the verdict that although Anderson "knew" about psychoanalysis, "he developed his themes quite independently of Freudian influence, but with such a startling likeness of approach that critics fell into the most excusable error of their times; it *seemed* an absolute certainty that Anderson should have been influenced directly by Freud."

For Mr. Hoffman, not using a Freudian approach himself, but a legalistic one, gives chief importance to conscious intention explicitly stated by the writer himself and not to unconscious determinants. Although the book is daring enough to give respectful attention to Henry Miller's blurry oracularities, it is conventionally academic in that it treats the influence of Freudianism on the literary mind as another scholar might treat the influence of the Koran on Milton's angelology. Do angels really smell, taste, see and hear with their whole bodies instead of with discriminated sense organs? That is not the question—but whether they are thus described in *Paradise Lost* and where Milton got the idea.

So with Freudianism, which becomes an idea like any other. "The role of the critic," Mr. Hoffman says in his chapter on influence, "is to examine quite objectively the ideologies of his time, with a view toward noting their applicability to or difference from aesthetics," and his own method exemplifies what he says of Kenneth Burke: "Burke believes that no simple or systematic explanation of modern thought is possible, for modern society is complex. The proper approach will therefore be as complex as is its subject; he advises what he calls a 'perspective by incongruity,' by means of which one may see all attitudes and theories with a kind of cosmic allowance for their contradictions and for the confusion which their mutually exclusive presence creates."

This objectivity prevents a really critical use of pyschoanalytic materials. In dealing with Thomas Mann, Mr. Hoffman is content to state the themes of the novels, and restate Mann's own comments on Freud. Mann's doctrine of the suspension of historical time through unconscious mythic recurrences he does not criticize in the light of recent proof by psychoanalytically trained anthropologists that these supposedly basic unconscious patterns are the products of specific cultural conditioning, and change with cultures and with time. And again with Kafka, Mr. Hoffman's method requires that he accept Kafka's explicit repudiation of Freudian ideas, and treat with sympathetic objectivity Kafka's—and Kierkegaard's—belief in a God "starkly cruel, cruelly whimsical, inaccessible to the yardstick of sufficient reason," whom man can find only after a despairing search to which personal and social well-being are obstacles. In his sharp separation of the aesthetic and the psychologic, Mr. Hoffman does not try to study in the case of Kafka the conditions under which an anxiety neurosis clearly determined by a particular relation with the father can be given expression of general social and aesthetic significance.

By such separation and by his apparent lack of interest in the development of psychoanalysis outside of literature, and as an analytic method as well as a body of ideas, Mr. Hoffman helps to keep Freudianism in the curious stepchild's position it has had now for 30 years in America, a semi-isolation which has had unfortunate effects on our political

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and cultural understanding and on the social ideas of the semi-detached Freudians themselves. But a scholarly and expository approach as intelligent and widely informed as *Freudianism and the Literary Mind* can be extremely valuable, nevertheless, especially as this is a much needed first book in its field. The accounts of the individual writers make excellent introductions to their work, aside from the question of Freudian influence. But most important, perhaps, is the very fully documented history from 1900 to the present time (Mr. Hoffman is also a specialist on little magazines) of the introduction of Freudian ideas in this country, the controversies over them, and the use of them by critics and novelists. Anyone who is interested in this question or expects to deal with it in the future will certainly have to make use of Mr. Hoffman's work.

ROBERT GORHAM DAVIS

Fascism in Fiction

The Pine Tree and the Mole, by Ezio Taddei. New York: Dial Press. 289 pages. $2.50.

IT IS joyful news that men who have been the victims of the Fascists have survived the chaos. And it is moving to know that among them are men who have reintegrated themselves and have taken up again their interrupted work. Ezio Taddei, on 18 occasions imprisoned by the Italian Fascists, is such a man. His first translated novel, *The Pine Tree and the Mole*, however, seems burdened with caution and constraint and this makes a large endeavor shrink at times to partial stabs.

The novel is concerned with Livorno during the period of the end of the first World War and the early days of fascism. An attempt is made to give a full and vivid picture of the social turbulence of these times and to delineate some of the historical facts of the alliance between members of the underworld and the Fascists, but his characters are not primarily political figures. Only one of his underworld characters, Rabaciuchi, a chicken-thief and former Anarchist who grows tired of an uncertain flop-house existence, is used by the Fascists; the other underworld characters form a background for Ruba's exploits.

The pattern of the alliance is completed with sketchy stories of the intrigues of high officials and their women. Michele Pellizzari, a none too successful lawyer, opportunistically becomes a leading Fascist. He cuckolds his best friend and becomes intimately connected with Rubaciuchi. Pellizzari eventually becomes disturbed by the activities of the Fascists and after his friend Casella, a lawyer who defends the Anarchists and Communists, is forced into exile to escape the Fascists, he returns to his native village seeking for a new solution.

Taddei interrupts the narrative to give the general political atmosphere of Livorno: the strikes, the police repressions, the elections, the returning veterans, but he seems to be holding back. Perhaps he was afraid that a fuller description and analysis would label the novel a political tract. But Taddei also holds back on his characters. He does not want the reader to become too interested in their destinies for he wants them to be significant as members of a group, but also he does not want his characters to be viewed simply


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as symbols of the social and political forces important in the birth of Fascism. Consequently the characters are pale and under-developed, occasionally coming to life when their sexual activities or reveries are described. But revelation of people's sexual lives, though an aid in giving interest to a story, does not lead automatically to a full evocation of people.

The novel does not come off. It takes more than sympathy for people to establish their individuality in a novel. Taddei perhaps can succeed in doing this if he unifies his intentions. *The Pine Tree and the Mole*, however, suffers from trying too much and succeeding too little.

OSCAR TARCOV

A Reader's List

THE STORY OF THE GREAT GEOLOGISTS, by C. L. and M. A. Fenton. (Doubleday, Doran, $3.50). For 2,500 years men have been trying to solve the mystery of the mixed-up-ness of the earth—rocks and minerals distributed in no apparent order on high mountains, under oceans and on the level land. Aristotle taught that rocks were formed by strange exhalations and violent winds from the interior of the earth. Thomas C. Chamberlin of the University of Chicago has given us the verdict of modern science based on the labors of thousands of men since Aristotle's time. This Fenton book is the story of some of these men as well as a very brief history of earth science. Many will enjoy reading it.

AN UNCOMMON MAN: HENRY WALLACE AND 60 MILLION JOBS, by Frank Kingdon (Readers Press, paper $1, cloth $2). Dr. Kingdon makes no secret of the fact that he is a warm admirer of Henry Wallace. His book is partly biography, partly a skillful summary of the main points in Wallace's philosophy, partly a fervent plea that America adopt that philosophy, or much of it, as a guide to the future. If you admire Henry Wallace, as do the *New Republic* editors and most of its readers, you will like what Dr. Kingdon has to say about him. If you don't like him, the book will probably give you apoplexy.

PLANNING No. 236. First-Aid for Exports (Political and Economic Planning. Available through the *New Republic*, 25 cents). Great Britain now has the unenviable task of restoring her commercial lines with the rest of the world. Although the demand for British exports will be great, a lack of purchasing power in other areas may impede the resumption of trade. PEP, however, is hopeful. Exports, the editors say, must be raised to at least six times the 1944 volume if vital goods for internal rehabilitation are to be obtained. The problem requires a continued tightening of the domestic belt, for home demand might easily encroach on production for export. The solution calls for immediate government assistance, yet ". . . it is precisely there," the broadsheet says, "that action is at present only dimly perceptible." Coöperation among exporters must be fostered; control over raw materials, prices and rationing must be continued; favorable tax rates and subsidies for exporters should be established; and long-term commercial agreements with other nations ought to be concluded. PEP suggests that these are but temporary measures. "Our acute need to restore and expand trade is alone sufficient justification for the use of these controls and restrictions. . . ." Yet one might rightly ask when the emergency will end. And how do such proposals square with the international program for trade reconstruction?

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New York Times Book Review $2.00

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ROLFE HUMPHRIES' latest collection of verse, *The Summer Landscape*, was published last fall by Scribner's.

WILLIAM MANDEL has been a consultant on Russia and special writer for the United Press since 1943. He was a research associate for the American Russian Institute in New York City, 1940-44, and lived in Russia for a year, where he attended Moscow State University. He is the author of *The Soviet Far East and Central Asia*, published last year by the Institute of Pacific Relations and Dial Press, and is now working on another book, *The Union of Soviet Republics*, to be published by Dial next January.

ANDREW ROTH is a writer on Far Eastern affairs whose third book, *Dilemma in Japan*, will be published in two weeks. He is one of the six writers and editors who were suddenly charged last June with unauthorized disclosure of allegedly confidential government information. Previously he was a lieutenant on active duty in the Office of Naval Intelligence.

ROBERT GORHAM DAVIS, an associate professor at Smith College and a frequent contributor to the critical journals, is engaged in a book on the psychology of plot.

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